French President Emmanuel Macron and his Polish counterpart Donald Tusk discussed the possibility of Western peacekeepers in Ukraine last week in the latest sign of just how much the Overton Window has shifted since Trump’s election. This subject used to be strictly taboo, and Macron was chastised by most Western leaders apart from Poland’s and the Baltics’ for floating the conventional deployment of foreign forces there earlier this year. Here’s everything of significance that happened since early November:
* 7 November: “Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It”
* 9 November: “The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict”
* 10 November: “10 Obstacles To Trump’s Reported Plan For Western/NATO Peacekeepers In Ukraine”
* 11 November: “Five Reasons Why Trump Should Revive The Draft Russian-Ukrainian Peace Treaty”
* 18 November: “The Moment Of Truth: How Will Russia Respond To Ukraine’s Use Of Western Long-Range Missiles?”
* 20 November: “Russia’s Updated Nuke Doctrine Aims To Deter Unacceptable Provocations From NATO”
* 22 November: “Putin Is Finally Climbing The Escalation Ladder”
* 29 November: “Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service Warned About A 100k-Strong NATO Intervention In Ukraine”
* 5 December: “Zelensky’s Flip-Flop On Ceasefire Terms Is A Faux Concession”
Reports suggest that Trump might try to put the squeeze on Putin by “escalating to de-escalate” on better terms for his side. The returning American leader also wants the Europeans to patrol any demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the Line of Contact (LOC), which could be unacceptable for Russia. At the same time, Trump condemned Biden and Zelensky’s new strategy of striking deep inside of Russia, thus hinting at rescinding this policy and possibly withdrawing such arms from Ukraine as a concession.
Proposals about freezing the conflict along the LOC aren’t anything new, but deploying Western/NATO forces along the resultant DMZ is something that hadn’t hitherto been seriously considered since it was thought to cross one of the reddest of Russia’s red lines, which could spike the risk of World War III. Nevertheless, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported late last week this is precisely what Trump envisages, albeit with those same European forces operating on a non-NATO mandate.
That tidbit suggests yet another concession to Russia aimed at assuaging its legitimate concerns and reducing the likelihood that another conflict could lead to a world-threatening scenario due to Article 5. Even so, the point is that what had previously been unthinkable is now being actively discussed behind the scenes, but Poland – which could play one of the most pivotal roles in this peacekeeping operation for reasons of geography and history – is getting cold feet as proven by its officials’ latest statements.
A spokesperson for its National Security Bureau said that “There is currently no consideration in Poland of any military involvement as part of stabilization forces in Ukraine.” This was followed by Sejm Speaker Szymon Holownia saying that “our participation in various types of military engagements in Ukraine could only take place under the NATO umbrella and within NATO structures.” Both comments preceded the Macron-Tusk meeting in Warsaw on Thursday, which was followed by a press conference.
The Polish leader declared, “To cut off speculation about the potential presence of this or that country in Ukraine after reaching a ceasefire… decisions concerning Poland will be made in Warsaw and only in Warsaw. For the time being, we are not planning such actions.” Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski then said the day after that his country’s first task is to defend its borders, but he also added that Poland is ready to provide logistical support for any peacekeeping operation if it actually happens.
These four comments were collectively interpreted by most of the media as meaning that Poland won’t participate in any such mission in Ukraine, but reading between the lines, it’s clear that there are some caveats. Holownia importantly clarified that Poland would only take part in it as part of NATO in an allusion to Article 5 security guarantees in the event that another conflict breaks out, though that’s not what Trump reportedly has in mind according to the WSJ.
Be that as it may, the US might convince Poland that such guarantees would still remain in force even if its participation in any such peacekeeping mission is outside of the NATO umbrella, though one can only speculate how sincere such assurances would be and whether or not Poland would be placated by them. There’s also next year’s presidential election in Poland to consider too since the ruling liberal-globalists and the (very imperfect) conservative-nationalist opposition are vying for the patriotic vote right now.
Reputable surveys suggests that Poles are getting fed up with the NATO-Russian proxy war and even with Ukraine in general as a result of the latter’s disrespectful approach towards Volhynia Genocide dispute. Proposing to put Polish troops in harm’s way for Ukraine’s sake, especially after one of Poland’s two Deputy Prime Ministers warned in early November that Zelensky is trying to provoke a Polish-Russian war, would harm the presidential prospects of whichever party it is that champions that policy.
Poland’s current political arrangement is such that the outgoing presidency is held by a member of the now-opposition who serves as the Commander-in-Chief so he’d have to authorize this for it to happen. It might therefore turn out that Poland’s domestic electoral considerations influence him not to go along with this even though he’s close friends with Trump and was just boasting about his party’s pro-US credentials during a speech at the opening of the US’ missile defense base in Poland last month.
A counterargument though is that Poland already feels excluded from the Ukrainian endgame after none of its representatives were invited to mid-October’s Berlin Summit between the American, British, French, and German leaders so he might also approve Polish participation in order to not be left out. In that case, the ruling liberal-globalists and the conservative-nationalist opposition would be equally to blame for this, thus neutralizing the electoral advantage for their opponent.
Another possibility is that both parties keep playing it cool in the hopes of winning more patriots over to their side (some are attracted to the ruling party’s tougher stance on Ukraine compared to the former government’s) and Poland just facilitates others’ participation in this mission. In that event, Poland would self-exclude itself even more from the Ukrainian endgame, but it wouldn’t run the risk of being hung out to dry if another conflict erupts but the US doesn’t recognize Article 5 on Ukrainian territory.
From Russia’s perspective, the increasingly serious talk about Western/NATO peacekeepers in Ukraine (even if they operate on a non-NATO mandate) is already concerning enough, but its threat perception would further worsen through Polish participation in such a mission. That’s because Poland plans to build Europe’s largest army and it already borders the Union State along the Belarusian and Kaliningrad frontiers so another conflict could lead to direct hostilities between Russia and NATO on their territories.
It’s precisely this scenario that Trump presumably hopes to avoid by reportedly suggesting that the peacekeeping mission be conducted under a non-NATO mandate, keeping Ukraine outside of the bloc for some period of time, and hinting at withdrawing Western long-range missiles from there too. His well-intentioned efforts would be all for naught if Poland participates in this mission, hence why it’s best to keep them out of this, but that’s more difficult to do than it seems for the reasons that’ll be explained.
The US can’t ignore Poland since it’s pivotal for the logistical success of any such mission, plus excluding it from discussions on this subject would be politically inappropriate, especially if its leadership expresses a sincere desire to take part in it (such as to avoid being further excluded from the Ukrainian endgame). It’s a NATO member so talks between the bloc’s members can’t easily be conducted without it, and any conspicuous exclusion of Poland could fuel suspicion and resentment, which are already boiling a bit.
There are also internal policymaking and external image pressures to consider too with regard to these forces arguing that Polish participation could “deter Russia from violating the ceasefire” for the same escalatory reasons that its participation should be avoided as was just explained. Snubbing a NATO ally that’s gone overboard portraying itself as the US’ most loyal member of the bloc would also look bad. These factors might thus throw a spanner into Trump’s peace plan and make it more dangerous.
Truth be told, it’s already very dangerous since he’s reportedly considering a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission there despite Russia previously threatening to target any such forces if they enter Ukraine, especially since keeping them out was a reason for the special operation. He’s taking for granted that Russia is bluffing or that he could “escalate to de-escalate” on the US’ terms if it isn’t, which is an unprecedentedly risky application of game theory with apocalyptic consequences if he’s wrong.
It would therefore be best if he stops entertaining this idea since it could end in disaster, but if he insists on moving forward with it and somehow gets Russia to accept a variation of this (ex: under a non-NATO mandate, etc.), then he and his team should see to it that Poland doesn’t get directly involved. If it does, then the risk of another conflict leading to World War III will hang as a Damocles’ sword over the everyone’s heads, and this could be exploited by radical ideologues in Kiev to blackmail the world.
