Semafor reported last week that Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) offered the US “exclusive operational control” of dual-use facilities in the Gulf of Aden, but the problem is that these ports and airports aren’t Somalia’s to give to the US. They’re located in Somaliland and Puntland, the first of which redeclared its independence in 1991 while the second withdrew from the federal system a year ago in protest of the central government’s constitutional changes.
HSM’s duplicitous offer came a little over a month after he pleaded with Trump to keep US advisors and aid. It also shortly follows Trump’s decision to initiate a strategic bombing campaign against Yemen intended to force the Houthis into lifting their blockade Red Sea, which led to a scandal after top officials were caught discussing this in a Signal chat. The aforesaid campaign parallels the US’ bombing of ISIS in Somalia and its support of the central government’s attacks against Al Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab.
Of relevance, the US Intelligence Community’s latest “Annual Threat Assessment” claims that the Houthis have partnered with Al Shabaab, the allegation of which first circulated in the media last summer after three unnamed Biden Administration officials talked to CNN about their supposed ties. To be clear, this doesn’t mean that those two are indeed partners, just that this is the public premise upon which the US is formulating its regional policies and thus places HSM’s offer into context.
More speculatively, “Project 2025” – which some believe is the blueprint for Trump 2.0 – called on the US to recognize Somaliland “as a hedge against the U.S.’s deteriorating position in Djibouti”, which the authors attribute to “malign Chinese activity”. There were also recent rumors that the US and Israel were considering “relocating” Gazans to Somaliland among several other locations, but Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adan clarified that the opening of diplomatic missions is a prerequisite for such talks.
Nevertheless, HSM might fear that the US could soon recognize Somaliland, whether in advance of its regional military-strategic interests and/or to facilitate Trump’s plans to ethnically cleanse the Palestinians from Gaza, thus explaining the urgency with which he made his offer. He might also be afraid that the US could soon withdraw its troops from Somalia and permanently reduce or cut off all aid to it, which he hopes to avert by exploiting its renewed anti-terrorist focus through his duplicitous proposal.
America’s official acceptance would be purely superficial since it could only assume “exclusive operational control” over those dual-use facilities in Berbera and Bosaso through respective arrangements with Somaliland and Puntland, however, neither of which it’s recognized as sovereign. Recognition would also be ruled out anytime soon if it reaffirmed Somalia’s sovereignty over Somaliland and Puntland by formally taking HSM up on his offer. Trump 2.0 might therefore not openly respond to it.
Maintaining silence like it has for over two weeks already if Semafor’s report is accurate would enable the US to keep its options open, thus possibly fostering negotiations between the three polities to achieve the best deal, provided of course that there’s interest in basing troops there. The US might instead want to retain its base in Djibouti and therefore decide to push back against China’s allegedly “malign activity” there as opposed to redeploying its forces to Somaliland, Puntland, and/or Somalia.
In any case, Somalia has no practical authority to grant the US bases in either of the two regions that it claims as its own since it has no control over them, though it should also be said that the international community officially recognizes Somaliland and Puntland as part of Somalia. That could soon change though if the US recalibrates its regional policy in light of newfound interests, hence why HSM is so eager to get Trump 2.0 to commit to maintaining its longstanding policy by agreeing to his duplicitous offer.
