Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed just visited Mogadishu in a reciprocal trip after Somali Prime Minister Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) traveled to Addis in early January and mid-February. This follows their second Turkish-mediated talks from mid-December and comes right after their top military representatives agreed to develop a “Status Of Forces Agreement” (SOFA) per their leaders’ will. That breakthrough paved the way for Abiy to visit Mogadishu as the latest phase of their rapprochement.
The larger context enables observers to better appreciate what’s happening. Somalia was manipulated by nearby Egypt and Eritrea into denying landlocked Ethiopia the sea access that it requires to preemptively avert socio-economic and therefore political instability in the coming future. Djibouti’s onerous port fees and Ethiopia’s reliance on this single corridor to the sea motivated Abiy to diversify his country’s options. Somaliland became his only option so they signed an MoU on this in January 2024.
The next eleven months were marked by HSM’s clumsy diplomatic maneuverings in response to the aforesaid agreement, which threw the Horn back into uncertainty since he and his dual patrons (Egypt and Eritrea) began saber-rattling about the consequences of the Ethio-Somaliland deal. The situation deteriorated to the point where it looked like Ethiopia and Egypt might fight a proxy war in Somalia and/or Somaliland amidst the transition to a new AU-led military mission (AUSSOM) at the start of 2025.
That worst-case but increasingly likely scenario was offset almost at the last minute after the second Turkish-mediated talks between the Ethiopian and Somali leaders in mid-December. While the MoU’s status remains unclear, most observers have concluded in the two and a half months since then that it was de facto suspended, apparently in exchange for Somalia including Ethiopia in AUSSOM. If that’s the case, then it represents a pragmatic compromise between these two, which is a pleasant surprise.
War is always to every average person’s detriment so all efforts should be undertaken to avoid it if realistically possible without subordinating one side to the other out of desperation. It had hitherto appeared almost inevitable that a proxy war would soon be waged in Somalia between Ethiopia and Egypt due to all sides’ (those three’s, Eritrea’s, and Somaliland’s) seemingly unshakable positions. That’s why it was so unexpected that Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan was able to avert this disaster.
If the Ethio-Somali rapprochement continues, then the risk of another regional war will greatly decrease, thus returning to the traditional scenario of Egypt egging Eritrea on to attack Ethiopia. Somalia’s (now-former?) dual patrons will understandably be upset as will Ethiopia’s (now-former?) Somalilander ally. All three would be limited in terms of what they can do though, with the first two being unlikely to provoke a regional war due to the absence of pretext while the second will just look elsewhere for recognition.
None of those three might forgive their respective (now-former?) ally since the Ethio-Somali rapprochement was unforeseen by their policymakers and upended their regional plans. The best-case scenario is that Egypt learns its lesson and stops meddling in the Horn, Somaliland secures recognition from the US, India, UK, Russia, and/or the UAE, and Eritrea enters into its own rapprochement with Ethiopia once President Isaias Afwerki passes away and if a more pragmatic leader takes his place.
