On April 2, 2024, we submitted a criminal complaint to the District Prosecutor’s Office that the law was violated during the counting of e-votes in the 2023 parliamentary elections. We emphasized two violations, the first concerning EHAK (Estonian Administrative and Settlement Classification) codes and the second regarding the validity of digital signatures.
Here is a simplified explanation of the validity of digital signatures to make it easy for everyone to understand:
Every online voting ballot requires a digital signature from the voter to confirm it. This process is like digitally signing a document with an ID card. A valid digital signature and an active certificate are required to verify each ballot.
The issue is that all online voting ballots signed with ID cards had expired and invalid certificates. If the digital signature on a ballot is invalid, it should have also been considered invalid.
Digital signatures’ validity involves complex cryptographic algorithms and key management, and they are significantly more technically complex than EHAK codes.
The National Electoral Committee, a body responsible for overseeing and regulating the electoral process, established the form for e-votes with Decision No. 47 of October 10, 2022, titled ‘Approval of the Ballot Paper and Electronic Vote Form for Parliamentary Elections.’ Clause 3.3 of this decision stipulates the following :
3.3. An open (decrypted) electronic vote is a data set in the memory of the e-vote processing application’s computer, consisting of four data elements and the tags separating them. The sequence of data elements and tags is as follows:
3.3.1. the EHAK code of the administrative unit, a unique identifier for each administrative unit in Estonia, and the tag ASCII hexadecimal code 2E;
3.3.2. the candidate’s registration number and the tag ASCII hexadecimal code 1F;
3.3.3. the name of the party or the designation of individual candidates and the tag ASCII hexadecimal code 1F;
3.3.4. the candidate’s first and last name.
It is important to note that Decision No. 47 was adopted on October 10, 2022, just a few months before the 2023 parliamentary elections. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the title of this decision is “Approval of the Ballot Paper and Electronic Vote Form for Parliamentary Elections” – it does not establish general requirements but specific requirements set exclusively for the 2023 parliamentary elections.
The above reveals that e-votes cast in the 2023 parliamentary elections must include the EHAK code. The possible EHAK code numbers range from 0001 to 9999, as seen in a document from Statistics Estonia. However, all e-votes cast in the 2023 parliamentary elections contained the designation “0000” instead of an EHAK code. This has been confirmed by the State Electoral Service in the National Electoral Committee’s Decision No. 84 of April 5, 2023, which stated that for parliamentary elections, the “EHAK code is always 0000.” This is a serious violation of the law and the form requirements established by Decision No. 47, and this issue must be urgently addressed.
The EHAK code “0000” does not exist. Thus, the State Electoral Service has admitted that all e-votes cast in the parliamentary elections contained an invalid EHAK code and violated the form requirements established by Decision No. 47.
The Supreme Court has previously explained the following:
“In Clause 3.3 of the National Electoral Committee’s Decision No. 6 of March 5, 2021, titled ‘Approval of the Ballot Paper and Electronic Vote Form for Local Government Council Elections,’ the decrypted electronic vote data elements are listed (administrative unit code [i.e., EHAK code], candidate’s registration number, candidate’s first and last name). It is invalid if an electronic vote does not meet these requirements.” [emphasis added] (RKPSJKo No. 5-21-15, Clause 27).
According to the prior practice of the Supreme Court, all e-votes cast in 2023 should have been declared invalid because they all lacked a valid EHAK code. However, The State Electoral Service disagreed with this assertion and held that the designation “0000” was correct. The SES explained as follows:
“This principle is also outlined in the structure description file on GitHub (lines 33, 44, and 55): ‘Administrative units EHAK code is 0000 in case of RK, EP, RH elections; in case of KOV elections, the code is parishes or city districts EHAK code.’ This is also described in the configuration file: ‘As agreed, for state-level elections, the EHAK code for the district is 0.'”
In summary, the State Electoral Service concluded that since an English-language sentence in a GitHub file states that the EHAK code for e-votes must be “0000,” this precedes Estonian legislation.
In our view, such a position was not valid. Decision No. 47 requires e-votes to include an EHAK code, and “0000” is not a valid EHAK code. An English-language sentence on GitHub cannot override Estonian law. The Supreme Court has previously explained that an e-vote without a valid EHAK code is invalid. Since all e-votes in the 2023 parliamentary elections lacked a valid EHAK code, it follows that all e-votes should have been declared invalid, but this was not done. We concluded that incorrect counting of votes was committed, constituting a crime under § 163 of the Penal Code.
The District Prosecutor’s Office has decided not to take legal action regarding a complaint about the e-voting system used in the recent parliamentary elections. Their reasoning was based on an explanation from the National Electoral Committee, which stated that in parliamentary elections, the EHAK code—used for electronic voting—is usually set to “0000.”
However, it remains unclear how this “0000” code was established, especially since it doesn’t match any actual administrative units. The rules for electronic voting are based on a specific official decision that clearly states each e-vote should include a valid EHAK code. Since “0000” does not represent any actual administrative unit, using this code in the 2023 elections raises questions. The District Prosecutor’s Office mainly reiterated the committee’s explanation without thoroughly investigating this issue. A thorough investigation must be conducted to ensure due process and uphold the integrity of the electoral system.
Daniel Mereäär, 22nd on the EKRE party’s national list, has contested this decision. EKRE received 16.1% of the votes and won 17 seats in the parliament, which unfortunately meant that Daniel did not secure a seat. If the e-votes had been considered invalid due to these apparent errors, EKRE could have garnered more votes, possibly winning 23 seats. This miscalculation directly affected Daniel by preventing him from entering parliament, indicating the situation had harmed him. Therefore, he had the right to fight against the decision not to proceed with a criminal investigation.
However, the Prosecutor General’s Office disagreed, stating that Daniel did not suffer harm from the voting errors and that inaccuracies in vote counting do not violate any individual’s rights. Because of this, they chose not to review his complaint.
Daniel then took his case to the Circuit Court, but the court dismissed it, concluding that he was not a victim in this matter and thus couldn’t file a complaint. Once again, they did not address the key issue of whether any violations had occurred.
Daniel appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court had previously supported a complaint in a similar situation, they unfortunately chose not to take on his case this time.
Here’s a concise overview of the key legal decisions in the 2023 parliamentary elections:
1. The District Prosecutor’s Office, while acknowledging that the Electoral Committee adhered to the rules, failed to delve into the complaints, thereby highlighting the necessity for comprehensive investigations in such matters.
2. The Prosecutor General’s Office decided that Daniel Mereäär couldn’t file an appeal and didn’t look into the actual issues raised.
3. The Circuit Court backed up the Prosecutor General’s Office, confirming that Daniel Mereäär couldn’t appeal and didn’t discuss the essential parts of the complaint.
4. Disappointingly, the Supreme Court did not address the complaint, leaving the audience with unfulfilled justice.
From these actions, it’s clear that most state institutions focused only on whether the correct procedures were followed without addressing the genuine concerns raised.
Here are the key facts:
– For the 2023 parliamentary elections, all electronic votes (e-votes) were required to include a specific code for the administrative region.
– Every e-vote submitted during these elections used the code “0000.”
– However, no administrative region in Estonia has the code “0000.”
– This means that none of the e-votes included a valid region code.
– The Supreme Court has stated that if an e-vote fails to meet the basic requirements, including the correct region code, it should be declared invalid.
– Despite all e-votes missing this valid code, they were still counted as valid votes.
13. After the elections, the National Electoral Committee took a proactive step by amending the rules for e-votes, underlining the importance of addressing issues raised in complaints.
The rules originally stated that an e-vote must consist of specific elements, including the correct region code, followed by details about the candidates. However, after a complaint was raised concerning the missing valid codes, the requirements were amended.
The new rules stated that instead of a valid code, the e-vote could include the string “0000.”
This rule change, which allowed using the string ‘0000’ instead of a valid code, raises significant doubts about the validity of the e-votes counted in the 2023 parliamentary elections.
Constitutional Basis for Elections in Estonia
The Estonian Constitution prohibits online voting, which means that using the Internet to vote goes against the country’s laws.
Article 60 of the Constitution states that the Riigikogu, Estonia’s parliament, has 101 members. These members are chosen through free elections. The elections must be open to all eligible voters, conducted relatively, and held in a way that ensures people’s choices are kept private.
To run for a seat in the Riigikogu, a person must be an Estonian citizen, at least 21 years old, and have the right to vote.
Regular elections for the Riigikogu occur every four years on the first Sunday in March. Special elections can also be held in certain situations, which happen 20 to 40 days after they are announced.
Main Point:
Online voting, as it is currently set up, goes against the rules in the Constitution that protect private and fair voting, which could harm the trust and legitimacy of our elections.
Documents regarding a significant and pressing issue have recently been submitted to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It will take some time to determine if the court will agree to take on this case, but the urgency of the matter cannot be overstated.
In addition, we plan to take further action by appealing to other European Union courts and institutions. We are also working on raising awareness in the European media about this situation, which concerns election fraud linked to Estonia’s online voting system. We believe that by working together, we can make a difference.
Our goal is to inform the public about possible problems with the voting process and call for accountability on a European level. Your role in raising awareness and engaging in this issue is crucial.
Objective:
• To declare the 2023 Riigikogu elections invalid and demand extraordinary elections.
• To dissolve the government of the Republic of Estonia.
• To annul online voting in Estonia.
Daniel Mereäär
and
NGO Konservatiivne Eesti
