Newly appointed Pakistani Ambassador to Russia Muhammad Khalid Jamali told TASS that Pakistan expects Russia to support its BRICS’ membership bid. It was earlier assessed last spring that “There’s No Credible Chance Of Pakistan Joining BRICS Anytime Soon” after Express Tribune hyped up that scenario ahead of the group’s summit in late August. After its expansion at that event, which doubled its members, Pakistan’s hopes were apparently renewed that it might join during next year’s one in Russia.
For that to happen, Pakistan would have to secure India’s support as well as Russia’s and everyone else’s, which is unrealistic for self-explanatory reasons. Furthermore, the criteria for admitting new members to the group after its last summit’s seemingly ad hoc decisions haven’t yet been officially revealed, so there’s no telling whether Pakistan even meets the requirements. Even if it does, however, then it can only count on perfunctory support from Russia.
Ambassador Jamali’s earlier mentioned interview was analyzed here, in which it was concluded that the ambitious vision of bilateral relations that he shared with TASS has no chance of materializing unless his country’s de facto US-aligned military leadership approves, which can’t be taken for granted. After all, they’ve already dillydallied on clinching a long-awaited strategic energy deal with Russia and even reportedly sent arms to Ukraine via the US after April 2022’s post-modern coup against Imran Khan.
It’s therefore understandable why Russia wouldn’t risk offending its decades-long Indian strategic partner’s sensitivities by enthusiastically supporting Pakistan’s membership in BRICS. Not only that, but Russian-Indian relations are poised to shape the global systemic transition even more pivotally than before if the incipient Sino-US thaw leads to a “New Détente” that could revive bi-multipolar processes. In that scenario, only those two Great Powers could be counted on to keep tri-multipolarity trends alive.
Those with an academic interest in International Relations should review this analysis about how “India’s Honeymoon With The West Might Finally Be Over” after the US allegedly suspected it of attempting to assassinate a Delhi-designated terrorist-separatist on American soil to learn more about the specifics. The point in referencing this context is to highlight the renewed importance of the Russian-Indian Strategic Partnership, which sets the stage for explaining Pakistan’s goal was set way too high.
Simply put, each will play a greater role in each other’s grand strategies than ever before in the event that Sino-US ties continue improving like those two’s leaders committed to doing, thus making it unrealistic for Pakistan to expect that Russia will enthusiastically support its BRICS’ membership. At the very most, Russia will abide by whatever rules the group agrees to for admitting new members and will therefore only extend perfunctory support in this respect, and only if Pakistan meets all the criteria.
This assessment will remain even in the far-fetched scenario that Pakistan’s de facto US-aligned military leadership approves the clinching of their long-awaited strategic energy deal and bilateral ties return to the excellent state that they were at prior to April 2022’s post-modern coup against Imran Khan. The fact of the matter is that India is much too important for Russia in the grand strategic context than Pakistan presently is or ever will be for the reasons that were previously touched upon.
To be clear, Russia regards its bilateral ties with any country to be independent of third parties’ influence and never advances them at third parties’ expense either, but nothing indicates that it’ll calculate that the benefits of enthusiastically backing Pakistan over India’s objections outweigh the overall costs. Such is the way that the world works regardless of however one feels about it, and with that in mind, nobody should get their hopes up for anything else otherwise they’re setting themselves up for disappointment.
