Radio Pakistan reported that returning Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif told new Russian Ambassador Albert Khorev that “Pakistan wants to enhance bilateral cooperation with Russia in a number of areas particularly in energy, trade and investment…[He] also urged the Russian side to send a delegation to Pakistan to hold discussions with their counterparts to identify ways to enhance the existing level of trade and investment ties between the two countries.”
For as encouraging as this statement of intent might appear to those who support the comprehensive expansion of their relations, it’ll likely amount to naught unless Pakistan does three things first. To begin with, it must liberate itself from the yoke of American hegemony under which it’s languished since April 2022’s post-modern coup against former multipolar Prime Minister Imran Khan. Without doing so, there’s no chance of clinching their planned energy deal that’s envisaged as the basis for strategic ties.
The second thing that Pakistan must do is repair its relations with the Taliban that were damaged over the past two years following concerns that this group is giving sanctuary to TTP terrorists amidst their nationwide Hybrid War offensive. This regional fault line impedes progress on the “International Transport Corridor” (ITC) that’s supposed to connect Russia and Pakistan via Afghanistan and Central Asia. Until this is resolved, Russian-Pakistani trade won’t approach anywhere near its full potential.
And finally, while Russia officially doesn’t regard its bilateral ties with any country as being influenced by third parties, it’s arguably the case that it privileges its decades-long strategic Indian partner’s concerns on sensitive issues such as formalizing Pakistan’s relationship with BRICS in some capacity. Without a political resolution to the Kashmir Conflict, such as by turning the Line of Control (LoC) into the international border as part of a mutual compromise, Russia is unlikely to let Pakistan into BRICS.
Frankly speaking, the likelihood of Pakistan making progress on any of these three points is very low. Shehbaz’s return to the premiership following unfree elections, which the US hypocritically turned a blind eye to despite making a big deal out of its supposedly values-driven foreign policy, suggests that he and his team are politically indebted to Washington and don’t dare defy its demands. Washington’s influence over the IMF, upon which Pakistani economic stability nowadays depends, reinforces this point.
Pakistan is pleading with the US for a sanctions waiver in order to complete its long-delayed gas pipeline with Iran and avoid up to $18 billion in fines if Tehran takes it to the International Arbitration Court and wins on the basis that Islamabad breached their contract. It probably won’t get one though since US Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu told Congress during a hearing in late March that there are “red lines” regarding Iran and that “it will be very serious for our relationship” if Pakistan crosses them.
He’s infamous for his role in the lead-up to April 2022’s post-modern coup after conveying thinly veiled threats to the former Pakistani Ambassador to America regarding what would happen to their relations if Imran Khan wasn’t ousted through superficially democratic means in parliament. The Pakistani Establishment, which refers to its powerful military-intelligence services that run the country behind the scenes, already capitulated to this pressure back when their country was much more sovereign.
Precedent therefore suggests that it’ll once again capitulate to this pressure after having lost so much sovereignty over the past two years since giving into that indirect regime change demand. On the off chance that Pakistan “goes rogue” from the US’ perspective, then the IMF’s purse strings could quickly be cut and sanctions imposed, while pressure could be placed on the current political set-up to resign if the US suddenly decides to probe the last election’s rigging allegations like Lu also hinted is possible.
According to Lu during his recent hearing, the US’ goal is to help Pakistan source non-Iranian gas, and this objective implicitly extends towards Russian gas and oil as well. It’s unimaginable that the US would refuse to react its newly restored vassal state purchasing those Russian resources when they’re still fighting a proxy war in Ukraine. For these reasons, the exact same punishments are expected – cutting off IMF aid and imposing sanctions – if Pakistan makes any real progress sourcing energy from Russia.
As for the Taliban-TTP part of what Pakistan must do in order to comprehensively expand ties with Russia, this is much more within the ambit of its authorities’ sovereign choice, but institutional corruption could lead to problematic policies. Responsible stakeholders want to resolve these problems in a way that improves national security, but irresponsible ones might believe that it’s better to let them fester in a “controlled” way so as to retain US security assistance on anti-terrorist pretexts.
So long as the frontier is defended enough to prevent large-scale attacks, then this corrupt faction might not care about improving ties with the Taliban in order to subsequently unlock the ITC’s full potential for expanding Pakistan’s trade with Russia since maintaining US security assistance might be their priority. It remains unclear what level of influence those irresponsible stakeholders have, but observers shouldn’t take for granted that responsible ones are calling the shots after all that’s happened since April 2022.
Moving along towards the last of the three things that must be done in order for Russian-Pakistani relations to truly blossom, there’s also no indication that Pakistan is interested in turning the LoC into the international border. If that changed and India agreed to this, then the resultant breakthrough could be a game-changer by opening up limitless economic opportunities for Pakistan that could finally enable the country to fully liberate itself from the American hegemonic yoke with time.
Nevertheless, it could also prove extremely unpopular at home since the cause of Kashmir independence or merger with Pakistan has become part of that country’s national identity over the decades, though the de facto state of martial law that’s been in place since last May could deter any serious protests. That said, this is the least likely to be achieved of the three things that Pakistan must do to comprehensively expand ties with Russia, thus meaning that Moscow will probably keep Islamabad out of BRICS for now.
To sum it up, nobody should get their hopes up of Pakistan doing what’s needed in order to make good on Shehbaz’s statement of taking ties with Russia to the next level. He’s politically indebted to the US for bringing him to power in the first place through April 2022’s post-modern coup and then turning a blind eye towards this year’s unfree elections that brought him back after a brief hiatus. Far from defying the US, he’s instead expected to continue formulating policy with the parameters that it sets.
