Balochistan’s Information Minister Jan Achakzai tweeted on Wednesday per Google Translate that “If another terrorist attack takes place in Pakistan, the Taliban have already been warned. There will be no other option. Pakistan will quickly enter Afghanistan and directly connect to Central Asia by capturing the Wakhan Corridor.” Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid chose not to react when asked about this by the media, instead downplaying the tweet as a local official’s view that doesn’t represent Islamabad’s.
This isn’t the first scandal that Achakzai’s social media activity has embroiled him in since he made headlines last December for proposing in a now-deleted tweet that Pakistan once again host US drone bases in response to another terrorist attack at the time. The emerging pattern is that this outspoken local official makes dramatic claims in the aftermath of some terrorist attacks, which can be interpreted as an attempt to psychologically pressure the Taliban since Pakistan accuses them of hosting terrorists.
As regards his latest tweet, there are three reasons why Pakistan is unlikely to invade and annex Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. For starters, its mountainous geography impedes military operations, but Pakistan could still invade via the Broghil Pass that connects it with that region. Even in that event, however, modernizing underdeveloped infrastructure could prove much more costly for this practically bankrupt country than relying on neighboring China or Iran for facilitating trade with Central Asia.
The next point is that there doesn’t even exist a semi-plausible political pretext upon which to make this move. There aren’t any anti-Taliban protests there, the locals haven’t held a referendum on joining Pakistan, and they’ve never been governed by Islamabad at any point in the past either. That being the case, the international response could see Pakistan become even more isolated than it already is, and it’s not unforeseeable that the IMF might cut off its financial lifeline to the country as punishment too.
Finally, Pakistan would risk angering its top American and Chinese partners if it made such a move. Both are officially against changing international borders through the use of force, the first much less sincerely than the second, but nevertheless the US wouldn’t want its traditional regional partner undermining the principle upon which Washington’s information warfare campaign against Moscow is waged. Without American approval, which is unrealistic to expect, Pakistan’s post-modern coup regime won’t do this.
These geographic, legal, and political arguments suggest that Achakzai’s tweet is indeed nothing more than an attempt to psychologically pressure the Taliban for its alleged hosting of terrorist groups whenever a high-profile attack takes place in Pakistan. This pattern will likely continue for as long as he remains in office since he’s establishing a reputation as an anti-Taliban hardliner. Observers are therefore advised not to take his dramatic claims seriously nor conflate them with Pakistan’s official policy.
