Kamran Yousaf, the Express Tribune’s senior foreign affairs correspondent, published a piece about “Russia’s Taliban Gamble”. He recalled the recent background that his colleague Imtiaz Gul referenced in his own piece on this broader subject two days prior, which was responded to here, regarding the polar opposite views on Taliban-led Afghanistan shared by Russia and Pakistan at the eighth Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan. Yousaf then tried to explain Russia’s rapprochement with the Taliban.
He correctly noted that “Moscow wants to preserve its influence in Afghanistan, prevent instability from spreading into Central Asia and contain the threat posed by Daesh. It also wants to limit the prospect of renewed Western military influence in the region.” Russian officials have explicitly said as much. Yousaf then cited some of the speculation that’s swirling around Pakistan about this. According to him, it “could partly reflect a desire to counter Pakistan’s historical influence in Afghanistan.”
He continued: “Islamabad has developed closer ties with the Trump administration, while its Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has added another dimension to its strategic relationships. Some observers speculate that Moscow may view these developments with suspicion, particularly if it believes Pakistan is moving closer to Washington or becoming part of a regional security arrangement that could affect Russian interests.” Yousaf concluded by reaffirming Pakistani policy.
In his words, “For Pakistan, the concern is straightforward: closer regional engagement with Kabul could reduce pressure on the Taliban to act against the TTP. Islamabad argues that dialogue must produce verifiable action against groups launching attacks inside Pakistan.” Ironically, this is identical to India’s approach to others’ ties with Pakistan, which India believes reduce pressure on Pakistan to act against the armed groups that it backs inside India. That’s something for Pakistani policymakers to dwell upon.
As for the two speculative motives behind Russia’s growing ties with the Taliban, the unnamed Pakistanis (presumably experts and/or officials) who he cites couldn’t be more wrong, since Russia doesn’t care about countering Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and doesn’t perceive the Mecca Pact as a threat. What Yousaf and his sources should be aware of, however, is Russia’s latent threat perception of Pakistan as informed by its Secretary of the Security Council, Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister.
Their remarks were referenced here, which was cited in the earlier mentioned response to Gul, the gist being that Pakistan is facilitating the flow of arms and terrorists to Afghanistan along with the possible return of Western military infrastructure to the region. None of this could realistically be facilitated by the Central Asian Republics, China, or Iran. To be clear, these Russian officials only strongly implied as much and didn’t directly accuse Pakistan, and Russia isn’t arming the Taliban (let alone against Pakistan).
Be that as it may, Pakistan should address these clearly conveyed suspicions, or it risks losing Russia’s trust with time. Yousaf was right that “Moscow has little reason to abandon its broader relationship with Pakistan” due to differences over the Taliban, but it also has little to lose if Pakistan is the one that abandons them. The same can be said about Pakistan. It therefore can’t be ruled out that Pakistan might sacrifice its ties with Russia over this issue to either make a point or satisfy the interests of its US ally.
