Title: “Estonia’s Digital Democracy — or Digital Deception?”
Author: Mike Calamus
Edition: Public Awareness Booklet, 2025
Chapters:
- Birth of the Digital Miracle
- Political Genesis — Kallas, Power & Code
- Private Code, Public Elections
- Power Without Parliament
- The Legal Black Hole
- Secrecy and Coercion
- Political Capture
- Elections That Divide
- Media, Money, and the Myth of Progress
- The Verdict — Why E-Voting Is a Scam
- THE FRAUD OF E-VOTING AND THE FALL OF ESTONIA by Lembit Silla
- Doubts About the Fairness of the 2025 Local Elections by Mario Maripuu
- A Small Piece of History by Mark Valdma
- Fraud Election by Mihkel Johannes Paimla
- Estonia Has Reached the Point Where the State Itself Can No Longer Tell the Truth by Taavi Saukkonen
- Internet Election Opinion by Vambola Kolbakov
- Who Really Won Estonia’s 2025 Local Elections? – Commentary by Mike Calamus
- Core Problem Areas Highlighted by OSCE/ODIHR
Birth of the Digital Miracle By NGO Conservative Estonia
Estonia rose from the ashes of the Soviet empire with a promise: to be different. To be digital. To be free.
The world applauded. We built the first paperless government, the first e-residency, and the first online elections. A miracle, they said.
But behind every miracle, there is a mechanism — and behind every mechanism, there’s control.
In 1991, the Iron Curtain fell, but not everyone behind it did. Many of the same party men, the same loyal administrators, changed their suits. They rebranded communism into liberalism. They traded ideology for EU funding. And while the people were dreaming of freedom, the elites were already designing the next system — one that looked modern but worked the same.
In 2005, that dream took shape as “internet-voting.” Estonia became the first nation in history to hold elections online. Newspapers called it revolutionary. Politicians called it transparent. And ordinary people — tired of queues and bureaucracy — believed it was progress. But the truth was more straightforward, colder, and far more dangerous: it was power, digitized.
The idea was sold as convenience. Vote from home, from work, from anywhere. But what it quietly destroyed was the ancient foundation of democracy — the secret ballot. When do you vote at home? Who is watching? When the code counts the votes, who is checking the code?
With the advent of online voting, democracy transitioned from the traditional polling station to the digital realm. While the system became more efficient, it also obscured the people’s view. Estonia’s digital miracle was born, but so was a potential digital illusion, a warning sign that democracy could be at risk.
The experiment had begun. And nobody asked who would end it.
Political Genesis: Kallas, Power & Code
Every system has an architect. Ours was Siim Kallas — a man with many titles and one obsession: control.
In the early ’90s, while the country was learning to breathe again, Kallas was already climbing. A former Soviet banker turned “liberal reformer,” he became the President of the Bank of Estonia. This position gave him access to money, networks, and the trust of a tired, hopeful nation. Then came the scandal. Tens of millions of dollars vanished from Russian bank accounts. The case was buried. Kallas walked away untouchably.
But he did not stop there. He reinvented himself as Europe’s man in Tallinn — the face of progress, the prophet of integration. In 1994, he founded the **Reform Party**, backed by Western investors, local oligarchs, and the same Soviet bureaucrats now wearing blue ties. He sold himself as the father of Estonia’s modernization. And for many, he was.
When Estonia joined the European Union in 2004, the Reform Party celebrated as if history had end. The very next year, they launched internet voting. They called it *the future of democracy*. In truth, it was the birth of a digital centralization system in which technology became a political weapon.
Every vote is now passed through machines built by private companies. The code was secret—the oversight — symbolic. The Reform Party won, again, and again. Coincidence? Maybe. But as old democracies taught us: if the process cannot be verified, it does not matter who wins.
Kallas understood this better than anyone. He wrapped control in the language of innovation. He built a firewall between the people and the truth — then called it progress. And when critics asked questions, he smiled, patted the servers, and said: “Trust us.”
That is how Estonia’s digital democracy began — not with openness, but with obedience.
Private Code, Public Elections
Every democracy rest on two crucial pillars: public law and public trust. In Estonia, these were replaced by private code, a shift that should have set off alarm bells.
Estonia replaced both with private code.
When e-voting was introduced, the government promised transparency. But the software was never open. It was written, maintained, and updated by a private company called Cybernetica AS
— a firm that once spun off from the state but now operates as a vendor. The very backbone of our elections was outsourced. This means that a private contractor, not accountable to the public, holds the keys to the nation’s ballot box. That is not democracy. That is dependency.
Cybernetica cooperated with Smartmatic, a Venezuelan-linked election firm infamous for scandals in the Philippines and Latin America. Together, they built something called the ‘Centre of Excellence for Internet Voting.’ This center, which sounds noble, is a tool for further entrenching the influence of external entities in our democracy. But who funds it? Who audits it? Who decides what version of the software runs during elections?
Even experts from Estonia, including those from the OSCE and ODIHR, have acknowledged that the public lacks a technical means to verify the integrity of the election system. Voters cannot view the code that runs on the election servers, nor can they compare it to the version that is ‘published.’ This lack of transparency requires individuals to trust the system without any evidence to support that trust.
Faith has replaced evidence. Trust has replaced transparency. And the same political structure that benefits from the system is the one that guards it.
Think about it: when a party can control the process and the technology, elections stop being contests — they become performances. And in Estonia, the script never changes. The same winners, the same narrative, the same “digital miracle.”
Our ancestors fought for the right to vote publicly — with paper, with witnesses, and with dignity. Today, we are told that invisible code on unseen servers is sufficient. That progress means silence.
But when democracy becomes a software license, the people become customers — not citizens. And the product they are buying is an illusion called trust.
Power Without Parliament
In theory, Estonia is a parliamentary democracy. In practice, our elections are run by a small circle of bureaucrats that no citizen ever voted for.
At the heart of the e-voting system stand two quiet institutions — the **State Electoral Office (SEO)** and the **National Electoral Committee (NEC)**. Together they form a digital priesthood of about sixteen officials. They hold the encryption keys, manage the servers, and supervise themselves. Parliament does not set the rules. People do not see the process. And the courts? They nod politely and move on.
Even the **OSCE/ODIHR**, the international election-monitoring body, admitted the truth in its 2025 report: most of Estonia’s e-voting rules are not laws at all, but *administrative regulations*. That means they can be changed by the same institutions that benefit from them — without a single parliamentary debate.
This is not how democracy is supposed to work. The Constitution says the foundations of elections must be written in law, debated, approved, and made accountable. But Estonia’s digital elections are built on shifting sand. They exist not by law, but by habit.
When **Arvo Aller**, vice-chairman of the Riigikogu’s Constitutional Committee, asked for transparency, he discovered what no citizen should ever hear:
The most crucial step in an election key creation is performed behind closed doors by people outside parliamentary control. Sixteen officials, one laptop, one sealed room. That is, it.
And who audits them? Their own vendor. **Cybernetica** signs the certificates, runs the tests, and confirms its own work.
This is not innovation — it is privatized sovereignty. A system where the government governs itself, the auditor audits himself, and the citizen merely observes the theater.
Our Parliament was meant to be the guardian of the vote. Instead, it became a spectator — watching quietly as power moved from the people’s house to the server room.
And once power leaves the hands of citizens, it never comes back without a fight.
The Legal Black Hole
In a normal democracy, if something goes wrong in an election, you can go to court. In Estonia’s e-voting system, you cannot.
Our laws give citizens the right to complain only about their *own* votes, not about the system itself. You can say, “My vote wasn’t counted,” but not, “The system is broken.” And even if you try, the courts will shrug and say: *too complex, too late, not our job. *
This is the **legal black hole** that swallows every challenge before it begins.
When conservative observers questioned the 2023 election, they found no door to knock on.
The **Supreme Court** admitted that “due to time limits and technical complexity, a full review of e-voting cannot be performed.”
Think about that. The highest court in the land says it is not technically capable of reviewing the foundation of our democracy — yet the system continues.
It is like a pilot saying he cannot see the instruments, but he will keep flying anyway.
Even the **ODIHR 2025 Opinion** confirmed this structural flaw: there is *no adequate legal remedy* for systemic violations in Estonia’s e-voting.
No independent way to verify, contest, or even understand how digital votes are overseen. When law cannot touch power, power becomes law.
This is not just a glitch — it is a design. A system engineered to look legal, while staying untouchable.
And the politicians know it. Every time a complaint disappears into the void, their confidence grows. Every time a judge says, “not possible,” another piece of democracy dies.
Elections without legal protection are like contracts without signatures — worthless. Estonia’s e-voting has turned the rule of law into an act of faith.
If justice cannot see the server, then the people cannot see justice.
And when the law stops being a weapon for the people, it becomes a shield for the elite.
That is not democracy — that’s digital absolutism.
Secrecy and Coercion
A secret vote is sacred.
It protects the poor from the powerful, the workers from the boss, the wife from the husband, and the citizens from the state.
Without secrecy, there is no freedom — only fear. Estonia’s e-voting broke that balance.
When you vote online, you do not enter a quiet polling booth. You sit at home, in front of a screen — visible, traceable, and vulnerable. Your vote travels through servers, IDs, and PIN codes. You trust that no one is watching, no one is copying, no one is logging. But you do not know. You cannot say.
OSCE/ODIHR said it clearly: secret voting cannot be guaranteed in an unsupervised environment. That means every vote cast online is based on faith, not fact.
Supporters like to point out that you can “re-vote.” They say this protects voters from coercion
— because you can always change your mind before election day. But that is an illusion.
If someone forces you to vote once — an employer, a spouse, a political handler — you might never dare to change it. The fear stays. The manipulation remains invisible.
In a real polling station, there are walls, observers, and procedures that shield the individual. At home, there is none of that.
The digital vote is alone — and so is the voter.
Experts like Anto Veldre warned that the e-voting system has no meaningful audit trail to detect forced or proxy voting.
Even worse, the duplicated electronic keys that encrypt votes can be reused or mismanaged. If the key leaks, the vote’s secrecy dies.
That is why the principle of “free, equal, and secret” enshrined in our Constitution does not apply online.
And when the state tells you it does, it is not protecting democracy. It is performing it. Freedom begins with privacy.
Estonia lost that day; it replaced the ballot box with a browser.
Political Capture
When technology meets ambition, the result is not always progress; sometimes it is capture. After 2005, the Reform Party became untouchable.
Election after election, their digital machine delivered victory. Critics questioned the results, but the same institutions that should have investigated — the courts, the police, the media — were already under the same roof.
Estonia did not just digitize voting. It digitized control.
At the top of the pyramid stood Siim Kallas, the architect of the Reform empire. His daughter, Kaja Kallas, carried the torch into the next generation — polished, Western, and ruthless. She branded herself as Europe’s defender against Russia, the face of “modern Estonia.” But behind the photo-ops, her government became a fortress of insiders, where loyalty mattered more than legality.
Her husband, Arvo Hallik, quietly traded with Russian companies while Kaja publicly condemned Moscow. When journalists asked questions, the police saw “no violation.” When the Parliament demanded answers, the coalition closed ranks. The message was clear: Reform protects itself.
Even scandals that would destroy careers elsewhere vanished.
The case of Marko Mihkelson, caught with explicit photos of a child, was swept away as “no public interest.” No investigation. No accountability. No outrage.
That is not justice — that’s protection.
Meanwhile, key state institutions — the Supreme Court, the tax office, and the prosecutor’s office — were filled with Reform-linked appointments. Dissenters were labeled extremists. Critics of e-voting were mocked as conspiracy theorists. And the police, once a shield for the citizen, became a sword for the system.
This is not paranoia; it is a pattern.
When the same party rules the servers, the courts, the press, and the narrative, elections become a ceremony. The result is always the same — not because the people love them, but because the code does.
Estonia calls it “stability.” I call it digital feudalism, where votes are currency, and power never changes hands.
Elections That Divide
Every democracy depends on one fragile thing — trust. Once it breaks, even the cleanest vote feels dirty.
The 2023 parliamentary elections were that breaking point. Paper ballots told one story: conservatives leading, momentum shifting, people demanding change. Then came the e-votes — and everything flipped. Overnight, the Reform Party and its new liberal ally, E200, jumped ahead by tens of thousands of votes. It was not just a win. It was a statistical miracle.
For many Estonians, it felt like the rug was pulled out from under democracy. In rural areas, where paper voting dominates, conservatives triumphed. In cities where digital voting was allowed, Reform soared. But when analysts compared the patterns, something did not add up. The gap between digital and physical votes was not normal — it was astronomical.
Observers demanded explanations. They got excuses. The State Electoral Office said everything worked “as expected.” The Supreme Court declined to review the technical process — again citing “time constraints.” And the international community? They clapped politely and looked away.
Yet the public did not. Polls by Norstat showed that 40% of Estonians believe digital votes were manipulated. Thirty-eight percent no longer trust the system at all. That is not democracy’s confidence — that is its obituary.
In a real democracy, power changes hands. In Estonia, power changes servers. Since 2005, no opposition party has won an election that relied on internet voting. Not once.
Even the OSCE gently admitted that the system “requires substantial improvement to meet democratic standards.” That is diplomatic language for *this is not okay. *
But Reform does not fix what benefits Reform. They are doubling down. They call critics “anti-technology” or “Russian propagandists.”
They drown truth in slogans about innovation.
And so, election after election, Estonia becomes more divided — not between left and right, but between those who believe the system works and those who have stopped pretending it does.
When people lose faith in the vote, they do not just lose faith in the government — they lose faith in the country.
Media, Money, and the Myth of Progress
When power fears the people, it silences them.
In Estonia, that silence does not come from tanks or prisons — it comes from the media. Two major corporations own most of the news landscape. The rest belongs to the state — taxpayer-funded “public broadcasters” that act like private PR arms for the ruling coalition. Every evening, the same faces, the same stories, the same tone: *the government is wise, dissenters are dangerous. *
The result? Manufactured consent. Independent voices exist — small online platforms, podcasts, NGOs — but they are buried under algorithms and quiet shadow bans. When conservative groups expose fraud or criticize digital voting, they are labeled “Russian agents.” When liberal outlets spread government lines, they are called “credible sources.”
Truth became partisan. And corruption became invisible.
Take the NGO Slava Ukraini. They raised over six million euros “for humanitarian aid.” Then the money vanished. Journalists traced it to political campaigns linked to the Reform Party’s spin-off, Eesti 200 (E200). The Foreign Minister, Margus Tsahkna, had ties. But the police refused to investigate.
“No public interest,” they said — the exact phrase they used for the Mihkelson scandal.
Meanwhile, ordinary Estonians are drowning. Electricity bills soared to the highest in Europe. Taxes climbed, and benefits shrank. Businesses closed while lobby firms bloomed. The media called it *necessary reform. * The people called it theft.
What once was a proud nation of engineers and entrepreneurs has become a playground for technocrats and PR strategists. They call it *smart governance. *
I call it *digital feudalism* where data replaces dignity, and propaganda wears a startup smile.
Real progress empowers citizens. Fake progress hypnotizes them.
And in Estonia, the myth of “the world’s first digital nation” is no longer a story of freedom — it is the perfect cover for control.
Technology is not evil. But when it belongs to one party, it ceases to be innovative. It becomes infrastructure for tyranny.
The Verdict: Why E-Voting Is a Scam
Let us strip away the slogans, the PR, the shiny brochures. Let us tell truth. Estonia’s internet elections are not a symbol of progress.
They are a symbol of *control* packaged as convenience, sold as innovation, and protected by silence.
Every core pillar of democracy has been broken. Transparency? Gone.
No citizen, no journalist, no party can independently verify how votes are counted. The code is private, the servers are sealed, and the audit trail is written by the same people who run the show.
Accountability? Gone.
Sixteen officials, hand-picked insiders, control the keys, the process, and the timing. When mistakes happen — or when power is abused — there is no way to prove it, and no one to stop it.
Equality? Gone.
Online votes and paper votes follow different rules, different systems, and various levels of visibility. In one, you see the ballot. In the other, you see nothing.
The Reform Party calls this *innovation. * I call it *institutional fraud. *
Since 2005, they have never lost an election decided by e-votes. Not once. Not because they are loved, but because the system they built cannot be challenged. It is their software. Their rules. Their results.
Even the OSCE, careful and diplomatic, warned that Estonia’s e-voting “requires substantial improvement to meet democratic standards.” Translation: it fails the test. A system that cannot be observed, verified, or questioned is not democratic — it is dictatorial.
Digital dictatorship does not come with soldiers or sirens. It comes with smiling anchors, glowing screens, and a friendly login page that says: *Welcome, voter. * Democracy is not about speed. It is about trust. It is about every citizen having the same, visible, undeniable proof that their vote counts.
Until Estonia returns to paper — to people — to transparency — we are not voting. We are participating in a simulation. And like every simulation, it exists for one purpose: To make you believe that control looks like choice.
Estonia deserves better. Democracy deserves paper.
THE FRAUD OF E-VOTING AND THE FALL OF ESTONIA
By Lembit Silla, 11.11.2025
Estonia’s e-voting system is not a success story. It is a political fraud — costly, insecure, and divisive — sold to the people as a miracle of the future.
But the future cannot be built on blind faith. If citizens cannot see how their votes are counted, it is no longer democracy. It is a religion whose god is code and whose priests are IT specialists.
And when faith requires darkness, it is not faith — it is manipulation.
ESTONIA STANDS ALONE IN A GAME OTHERS HAVE ALREADY ABANDONED
Across Europe, every nation has tested e-voting, and all have abandoned it.
Finland ran pilot projects between 2008 and 2010. The system was declared a failure after the National Electoral Commission concluded it was unverifiable and insecure. Finland decided that a citizen’s vote must never be replaced by code.
Germany banned e-voting in 2009 after a ruling by its Constitutional Court, which stated that transparency in elections must be guaranteed without specialized technical knowledge or blind trust in machines. Citizens must be able to see and understand how their votes are counted. No one should ever be told, “You just have to believe.”
The Netherlands, Norway, and Ireland all tried — and all abandoned — e-voting. Ireland spent millions on its system, only to throw it away when it failed to meet the basic standards of democracy.
And Estonia? Estonia continues as if nothing happened — the only country in the world that insists everything is fine, even though no one is allowed to verify it.
IF YOUR SUIT HAS A HOLE, YOU DON’T GO ON STAGE
If my suit had a hole, I would not step on stage and hope nobody noticed. Yet this is exactly what the Estonian government is doing: “Our system has flaws, but you just have to trust us.”
No. This is not a child learning honesty — this is state governance, the trust of an entire nation. And there is no place for the phrase “let’s hope for the best.”
When a leader tells the people that “it doesn’t have to be perfectly secure, just trust us,” that is not democracy — that is arrogance disguised as authority.
ESTONIA NO LONGER VOTES — IT CONFIRMS
We are told that e-voting is faster and more convenient. But convenient for whom? For politicians who no longer fear accountability? For a system that prevents citizens from seeing who won and why?
Estonia no longer votes. Estonia confirms — it confirms the same political cartel that trades power like roles in a movie whose script was written long ago.
CODE CANNOT BE SECRET
If the code is secret, the result is secret. If the servers are audited by those who built them, it is not oversight — it is self-protection. An election system that citizens themselves cannot audit is not democracy; it is a digital trap of trust.
2019: “WHO SIGNS FOR RESPONSIBILITY?” — NO ONE DID
This is not speculation; it is on record. In 2019, during a live broadcast on Estonia’s National Television, the creation of e-voting “security keys” was shown to the public. It was supposed to be an official, transparent procedure. Cameras were rolling, observers were present.
Then came the moment when someone had to sign off that the process was secure. Silence. The IT specialist, holding the core of the system, simply froze. The supervisor asked, “Who signs that this is secure?” No one did. Not a single signature. Not a single act of responsibility.
Independent oversight was laughed off — live on air. No one took accountability. That was not rumor. That was fact. And that moment revealed more than any audit ever could: in Estonia, there is no accountability, not even where the heart of the nation — its election result — is at stake.
When no one in the entire system dares to sign their name under the claim that the elections are secure, the problem is not technical — it is moral.
THE PEOPLE WERE NOT CONQUERED BY TANKS, BUT BY SERVERS
Estonia’s independence was not lost on a battlefield. It was lost in a server room, where honesty was replaced with code and verification with faith. This is no longer freedom; it is a structure designed to ensure the public never truly knows what is happening. And I say — enough.
WE DON’T NEED A NEW APP. WE NEED A NEW HONESTY.
Democracy is not a technical process — it is a moral commitment. Elections cannot take place in closed systems where “some know and others must believe.” Elections must occur where every citizen can stand behind their vote — on paper, visibly, verifiably.
Honesty does not fear light. Only deceit does
A PUBLIC MOMENT OF TRUTH
Estonia needs a public decisive moment — a point at which servers answer to the people, not the government; where code belongs to the Constitution, not to private contractors; where elections become sacred again, not spreadsheet rituals.
E-voting is not democracy. It is an illusion, built to keep the people asleep while decisions are made elsewhere.
But I am not asleep. And I will not stay silent.
Because truth does not have to be pleasant. It must only be the truth. Lembit Silla
Father and Citizen 11.11.2025
Doubts About the Fairness of the 2025 Local Elections
**(City of Tartu, Electoral Alliance “Plan B”) **
**Prepared by: ** Mario Maripuu, Candidate No. 190 (Electoral Alliance “Plan B”)
**Date: ** October 27, 2025
1. General Observation
The 2025 local elections cannot be considered fully compliant with the Estonian Constitution. The elections were **neither equal nor held on a single day**, as required by the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia.
Early voting and e-voting created a situation where some voters voted under different conditions than others — raising doubts about **equality, transparency, and accuracy** in vote counting.
—
2. Political Influence Before the Elections
On **October 2025**, just before election day, **Prime Minister Kristen Michal** publicly declared that *“he will do everything to ensure that the party KOOS and the electoral alliance Plan B will never be elected.” *
Such a statement, coming from the Prime Minister himself, calls into question the **neutrality of the elections** and raises a legitimate concern about whether **state power was used for political interference**.
—
3. Anomalies in Vote Distribution in Tartu
According to *Postimees*, the electoral alliance *Plan B* received the following results in Tartu:
- Andro Roos **399 votes**
* Enni Vaarmann — **thirty votes**
* Ülle Pukk — **twenty-three votes**
* …
* Mario Maripuu **four votes**
Out of twenty-six candidates, **fifteen received between 0 and 4 votes** an **implausibly low** result considering that these individuals are active members of their local communities, many of whom have friends and relatives among the voters.
The **statistical likelihood** that such a substantial portion of the list would receive fewer than five votes is **extremely small**.
—
4. Evidence and Testimonies
Multiple testimonies on **social media** suggest that voters’ ballots for specific candidates
**did not appear in the results**.
Candidates themselves also observed irregularities — their vote counts changed after recounts, sometimes **dropping significantly** (for example, *Kadri Vilba’s case*, where ninety-three paper votes disappeared after the recount).
—
5. Problem of Lack of Verifiability
The **secrecy of voting** prevents any later verification of whether a particular vote went to the intended candidate.
This makes **fraud detection impossible** and reduces the entire process to a matter of
**trust** citizens are told that the elections were fair, but **no factual verification** is available.
—
6. Conclusion
Based on the above, there are **strong reasons to question the fairness and transparency** of the 2025 local elections.
The concerns include:
- **Constitutional compliance**,
- **Political interference**,
- **Accuracy of vote counting and reporting**,
- **Lack of independent control and verification**.
A Small Piece of History By Mark Valdma
Let me add a small piece of history.
A globalist once described the future in a way that closely mirrors what has happened in Estonia. There is a direct similarity with the communist leaders of the Estonian SSR who seized power and monopolized the process of creating the Republic of Estonia.
In 1962, Marshall McLuhan said in his lectures:
- “The new electronic independence will recreate the world as a global village, where power will be concentrated in the hands of the super-rich. Through money and loans, they will take over international organizations and begin to control the world — WTO, WHO, UN, IMF, the Atlantic Council, and others.
>
- For the New World Order to function, it is essential to move people into electronic databases
— where citizens choose their ‘democratic’ representatives, while their consumption habits and obligations (through replacing cash with credit or loyalty cards) are monitored and controlled. Governments will have the right and the means to influence people’s will and capacity for action based on social obedience, leaving the people unable to control their own independence.
That is what McLuhan said back in 1962.
—
What Has Happened Since?
What happened is that governments seeking greater control over their citizens have started putting this idea into practice.
Countries like Venezuela, Russia, and Estonia have introduced electronic voting systems. In name, these systems represent the “will of the people,” but the results are determined by algorithms favoring those in power — those who want to keep control and have the exclusive right to shape election outcomes for their own parties.
A large part of the European Union is now switching to interactive payment systems. Many government-backed companies have stopped accepting cash and replaced it with digital payment systems — a move that centralizes power and allows tighter control over people’s travel, accommodation, car rentals, insurance, and more.
We can also see that many international organizations and small states now operate like private corporations owned by the super-rich — setting the rules of political ideology and mandatory action.
The list could go on. But one thing is clear: Estonia has tried to be a digital pioneer to keep those in power firmly in place — through e-voting, the transition to virtual payment systems, and beyond.
E-voting is not trustworthy, even if the recommended security standards (over twenty-five points) are met or if the constitution and related laws are changed — because deep inconsistencies remain.
The Estonian government is not legitimate, as it has not been truly elected by the people since the introduction and dominance of the e-voting system.
—
**Respectfully, **
**Mark Valdma** Conservative Naturalist
Mark Valdma, *Institute of Traditional Wisdom (MTÜ Pärimustarkuste Instituut) *
Election Fraud
By Mihkel Johannes Paimla
**Why do I claim that people were deceived? **
Because the *Parempoolsed* (Right-Wingers) and especially the *Social Democrats* received an *unreal* number of e-votes.
Let me give some examples.
—
### **Central District (Kesklinn): **
**Social Democrats** – 6,155 e-votes (74.8% of all 8,227 votes)
**Centre Party** – 1,906 e-votes (35.1% of all 5,433 votes)
**Parempoolsed (Right-Wingers) ** – 2,931 e-votes (73.5% of all 3,986 votes)
**Lavly Perling** – 2,317 e-votes (73.4% of all 3,155 votes)
**EKRE** – 392 e-votes (27.4% of all 1,430 votes)
**Reform Party** – 2,674 e-votes (78.9% of all 3,391 votes)
**Isamaa (Fatherland Party) ** – 2,176 e-votes (60.2% of all 3,613 votes)
**Estonia 200** – 740 e-votes (74% of all 1,000 votes)
More details:
[Official source →] (https://kov2025.valimised.ee/et/detailed-voting-result/greater_municipality/0784/electoral_district/2)
—
### **Lasnamäe District: **
**Social Democrats** – 2,260 e-votes (61.1% of all 3,700 votes)
**Centre Party** – 6,756 e-votes (19.9% of all 33,880 votes)
**Parempoolsed** – 596 e-votes (67.9% of all 878 votes)
**EKRE** – 244 e-votes (20.1% of all 1,213 votes)
**Reform Party** – 866 e-votes (64% of all 1,354 votes)
**Isamaa** – 1,505 e-votes (52.9% of all 2,844 votes)
**Estonia 200** – 328 e-votes (72.8% of all 454 votes)
More details:
[Official source →] (https://kov2025.valimised.ee/et/detailed-voting-result/greater_municipality/0784/electoral_district/4)
—
### **Nõmme District: **
**Social Democrats** – 3,414 e-votes (65.8% of all 5,185 votes)
**Centre Party** – 741 e-votes (27.9% of all 2,658 votes)
**Parempoolsed** – 1,676 e-votes (63.1% of all 2,564 votes)
**EKRE** – 234 e-votes (17.8% of all 1,313 votes)
**Reform Party** – 2,020 e-votes (69.9% of all 2,894 votes)
**Isamaa** – 2,021 e-votes (47.8% of all 4,232 votes)
**Estonia 200** – 429 e-votes (70.4% of all 609 votes)
More details:
[Official source →] (https://kov2025.valimised.ee/et/detailed-voting-result/greater_municipality/0784/electoral_district/6)
—
### **Põhja-Tallinn District: **
**Social Democrats** – 4,783 e-votes (73.6% of all 6,502 votes)
**Centre Party** – 2,121 e-votes (19.9% of all 10,683 votes)
**Parempoolsed** – 1,654 e-votes (71.1% of all 2,325 votes)
**EKRE** – 189 e-votes (19.9% of all 952 votes)
**Reform Party** – 1,374 e-votes (74.4% of all 1,846 votes)
**Isamaa** – 1,065 e-votes (52% of all 2,050 votes)
**Estonia 200** – 629 e-votes (72.9% of all 863 votes)
More details:
[Official source →] (https://kov2025.valimised.ee/et/detailed-voting-result/greater_municipality/0784/electoral_district/8)
**Summary**
In all these districts, the share of e-votes for the **Reform Party**, **Social Democrats**, and
**Parempoolsed** clearly exceeded **sixty%**.
For **Isamaa**, the lowest level was **forty-eight%**. For **Estonia 200**, it was **over 70% everywhere**.
Meanwhile, the **Centre Party** reached only about **thirty-five%**, and **EKRE** topped out at **twenty-seven%**.
What more proof is needed to show that the *deep state* manipulated the votes?
**Mihkel Johannes Paimla** Editor-in-Chief, *EestiEest.com*
Estonia Has Reached the Point Where the State Itself Can No Longer Tell the Truth By Taavi Saukkonen
Estonia has reached a point where the state itself admits that it can no longer tell the truth — not because the truth is dangerous, but because it endangers power.
The head of the National Electoral Office calmly states that “we cannot disclose sensitive e-voting information simply because an observer asks for it.”
But who exactly is “sensitive”? The people? The observer? Or the system itself — whose entire strength depends on the survival of a lie and on the absence of transparency?
We have come to a moment where electoral transparency has become a national security risk. It is like a homeowner saying he cannot show you the front door, because you might notice that the house is rotten from within.
THE MECHANISM OF MUTUAL PROTECTION
A debate was held in Parliament to temporarily suspend e-voting and verify the integrity of the system.
But the Reform Party and Eesti 200 voted the motion down.
Why? Because they cannot afford even the slightest chance that the lie might be exposed.
The system is built in a way that protects everyone else:
The Electoral Office protects the Commission, the Commission protects the Supreme Court’s decision, and the Supreme Court in turn protects the political status quo.
This is no longer democracy — it is a closed circle of protection, where each holds on to another is lie so that none of them collapse under the weight of truth.
THE SUPREME COURT ACKNOWLEDGED VIOLATION OF LAW
The Supreme Court did not dare to act, but in its ruling, it admitted that during the publication of the e-voting code, the law was violated, and the key-generation procedure was not followed.
When the law is broken, it is no longer a “technical error” — it is fraud.
But the system remains silent because the lie has grown too large to contain.
THE OSCE REPORT — TRUTH TWISTED INTO A LIE
The Electoral Office claims that the OSCE international observers confirmed the security of e-voting.
That is a direct falsehood.
The report lists more than twenty corrections that must be made before the system can even be considered dependable or observable.
This means the current system does not meet even the minimum international standards. But the public is told otherwise because people do not read reports — they read headlines. And the headlines are controlled by the government.
AUDITOR AND AUDITED — THE SAME PERSON
The so-called “recount” process is a farce.
The Electoral Office appoints its own auditor; the auditor is connected to the Information System Authority, and both are verifying their own work.
That is not an audit — it is paper camouflage for systemic collusion.
When someone demands independent verification, they are told it would pose a “security risk.” But the real security risk is a state that fears the exposure of truth.
THE REALITY THEY DON’T WANT TO ADMIT
- We cannot verify which hardware or network connections are
- We do not know whether the audited software is the same that counts the
- We cannot confirm the integrity of the
- We cannot even prove that any single electronic vote truly reflects the voter’s
When a system itself says: “We cannot guarantee the integrity of results,” there is no point continuing the argument.
This is no longer democracy — it is a digital illusion disguised as progress but built to secure power without accountability.
ESTONIA DOESN’T NEED LIES — IT NEEDS HONESTY
We must end the silence because silence is what allowed this to happen.
Everything that now becomes known — no matter how dark, foul, or shameful — is still better than what remains hidden.
Only what is acknowledged can be corrected. And only what is faced can be redeemed.
Taavi Saukkonen November 11, 2025 Estonia
### Opinion by Vambola Kolbakov
**§ 60**
The Riigikogu (Parliament of Estonia) has 101 members. Members of the Riigikogu are elected in free elections based on the principle of proportional representation. The elections are general, equal, and direct. Voting is secret.
Any Estonian citizen with the right to vote and who is at least 21 years old may run for the Riigikogu.
Regular parliamentary elections are held on the first Sunday of March in the fourth year following the previous elections.
Extraordinary parliamentary elections are held in the cases provided in §§ 89, 97, 105, and 119 of the Constitution, no earlier than twenty and no later than 40 days after the announcement of the election.
The procedure for electing the Riigikogu is set out in the Riigikogu Election Act.
—
**§ 156**
The representative body of local government is the council, which is elected in free elections for a term of four years. The law may shorten the council’s term due to the merger or division of municipalities, or if the council is unable to function. The elections are general, equal, and direct. Voting is secret.
People who permanently reside in the territory of the municipality and are at least sixteen years old have the right to vote in local elections, under the conditions provided by law.
—
### Interpretation and Opinion
In the elections of the Riigikogu, the most crucial factor is the definition of **the bearer of supreme power** — and according to the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, this bearer is
*the People*.
Through regular elections, the People choose 101 representatives to the Riigikogu, who then exercise the highest authority on behalf of the People for the next four years.
This is an extremely important — the *most important* — principle on which the functioning of the Republic of Estonia is built within the framework of its Constitution.
To guarantee the operation of this principle, elections for those who exercise power in the name of the People must comply with the Constitution. Any form of legal interpretation — common in other contexts — is *not acceptable here*, because any reinterpretation of the law would be
equivalent to losing the true meaning of the Constitution and, along with it, Estonia’s statehood itself.
All laws and regulations developed for this purpose must strengthen and preserve these constitutional foundations as the base principles of the State’s daily functioning.
—
### But What Is Reality?
All these constitutional principles are being ignored — especially using **electronic voting (e-voting) **, which allows people to vote via computers and, in the latest local elections, even though mobile applications.
By introducing and legitimizing e-voting, the principle of *equal voting rights* was immediately violated — and this alone already makes e-voting unconstitutional.
- **Equality: ** In e-voting, a voter can change their vote as many times as they A paper-ballot voter can vote only once.
- **Directness: ** In e-voting, it is impossible to fully guarantee that the person casting the vote is the same person identified in the digital system. Identification codes can be used by anyone — a relative, a trusted acquaintance, or even someone acting under threats.
- **Secrecy: ** Unlike paper voting, e-voting cannot ensure secret voting, since it is impossible to monitor or control the voting environment at someone’s home. The constitutional right to the inviolability of private property and home prevents such checks. The secrecy of a citizen’s vote is not guaranteed by anything.
Even the few audits conducted so far have shown that the **Election Committee itself cannot ensure the secrecy of electronic votes**. This is not only strange but also directly points to the possibility of manipulation within the servers of the National Election Committee.
Furthermore, **the voting period** used in Estonia today clearly violates the Constitution. The Constitution provides for a single voting day, yet early voting takes place over six days. By that time, about 60% of all votes have already been cast — often during an active campaign period when voters are being directly advised or influenced even as they approach the polling booths.
—
**Vambola Kolbakov**
Estonian entrepreneur and public figure
## **Who Really Won Estonia’s 2025 Local Elections? **
*Commentary by Mike Calamus*
It is said that there was no single “national winner” in Estonia’s 2025 local elections. True — on paper, the picture looks fragmented: every city with its own leaders, every council with its own colors.
But look deeper, and you see a familiar pattern — the same system, the same shadow power.
—
### **Nationwide Picture**
**Turnout: ** 59.2–59.3% (Election Day: 19 October 2025, official data)
**Sources: ** ERR, Äripäev, Valimised.ee
* **Tallinn** – Centre Party 37 seats, SDE 17, Isamaa 11, Reform 8, Parempoolsed 6
* **Tartu** – Won by Isamaa, coalition talks with Reform
* **Pärnu** – Isamaa 10 seats of thirty-nine
* **Narva** – Mihhail Stalnuhhin’s local list 12 of 31
* **Kohtla-Järve** – Centre Party 14 of 25
* **Viljandi** – Isamaa 11, “With Heart in Viljandi” 9, Reform 4, EKRE 3
* **Haapsalu** – Isamaa 11 seats (over 40% of votes)
On the surface, this looks diverse.
Power remains in the hands of the same small circle.
—
### **Reform Party – the Face of the Old System**
It is striking that the **Reform Party**, despite years of declining popularity, remains a dominant force.
To many, it represents an *establishment party* deeply tied to EU-oriented liberal policies.
Its roots go back to the 1990s, when Estonia’s post-Soviet transition mixed new ideals with old connections.
Since then, the party has consistently won elections and controlled key ministries.
A turning point came in **2005**, when **internet voting** was introduced — a digital experiment that critics say cemented the establishment’s dominance.
Today, the party is led by **Kaja Kallas**, under whom Estonia has become one of Europe’s most digitized — and most expensive — economies.
—
### **Res Publica and Isamaa – the Backup Plan**
When Reform’s popularity declined in the early 2000s, a new movement appeared: **Res Publica**.
It was marketed as a conservative alternative, yet its founders had close ties to earlier liberal circles.
Later, Res Publica merged with **Isamaa**, forming a new political bloc that has remained close to Reform in key policy issues — especially on EU and foreign affairs.
Despite nationalist rhetoric, Isamaa has often aligned with Brussels and Washington.
Its leaders have supported mainstream European policies that many voters view as contrary to national sovereignty.
—
### **Parempoolsed – a Controlled Opposition? **
In **2022**, a new party called the **Parempoolsed (Right-Wingers) ** emerged.
Although the name suggests a conservative direction, many observers consider it a technocratic, centrist group with roots in existing state institutions.
Its leader **Lavly Perling**, a former prosecutor, is married to a senior official of the Estonian Internal Security Service.
The party appeared at a time when **Eesti 200**, another centrist newcomer — was losing support, suggesting a reshuffling within the same political landscape.
—
### **Eesti 200 and the “Slava Ukraini” Controversy**
The party **Eesti 200**, once a promising liberal movement, became embroiled in public controversy in 2022 after large donations to a humanitarian organization raised questions about financial transparency.
While investigations followed, they produced no clear resolution.
The scandal damaged public trust, reinforcing perceptions of blurred lines between politics, NGOs, and campaign financing.
—
### **Social Democrats – Dependable Partners of Power**
The **Social Democratic Party (SDE)** continues to be a loyal coalition partner to Reform. Its platform blends European social-liberal ideals with local welfare policies.
Estonian politics has increasingly resembled a **tight-knit circle**, where party leaders and families overlap — an elite network serving similar agendas despite differing labels.
—
### **Final Verdict**
So, who really won the 2025 local elections? Not the people. Not the local communities.
**The real winner was the establishment** a coalition of long-standing parties and their satellite movements.
KOV 2025 was not a clash between past and future.
It was another episode in a political series that began in the 1990s. The cast remains the same. The people change.
And as long as the election system stays **digital, opaque, and unaccountable**, there are no real elections — only **the appearance of democracy**.
**Estonia deserves a new beginning: honest elections and a free press — not another political performance. **
Summary of the problematic or critical points raised in the OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on Estonia’s Internet Voting Regulation (Opinion-Nr. ELE-EST/527/2025, Warsaw, 17 June 2025): https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/593435.pdf
### � Core Problem Areas Highlighted by OSCE/ODIHR
**1. Lack of Broad Political and Public Consensus**
- Future changes to e-voting law should occur **only after broad consultations** and with
**cross-party and public support**.
- Amendments so far were **adopted by the ruling majority alone**, without sufficient involvement of opposition parties or civil society.
→ *Risk: perceived political bias and reduced legitimacy. *
**2. Insufficient Legal Clarity and Definitions**
- The **Riigikogu Election Act (REA)** still lacks clear definitions of **key concepts**, criteria, and decision-making procedures.
- OSCE urges legislators to **explicitly regulate** universality, equality, secrecy, and free voting rights in the online context.
→ *Risk: inconsistent interpretation and potential constitutional ambiguity. *
**3. Weak Protections for Vote Secrecy and Coercion Risks**
- Internet voting is **vulnerable to coercion and group voting**, particularly in **care homes or shared-device settings**.
- ODIHR recommends a **mandatory “I voted freely and secretly” declaration**, voter education, and stronger post-election audits.
→ *Risk: votes cast under pressure or supervision cannot be verified as secret. *
**4. No Legal Obligation for System Audits or Breach Monitoring**
- While monitoring is done informally, the law **does not require** audits for breaches or coercion detection.
- OSCE calls to **mandate active monitoring and post-election forensic audits** by NEC, SEO, and RIA.
→ *Risk: undetected system vulnerabilities and untraceable manipulation. *
**5. Ambiguous Powers of the National Electoral Committee (NEC)**
- Criteria for **suspending, terminating, or invalidating** online voting are **not legally defined**.
- OSCE says NEC decisions must be based on **clear, objective standards** to avoid
→ *Risk: inconsistent or politically influenced interventions. *
**6. Insufficient Public Transparency and External Oversight**
- Public and expert access to verification or observation is **unclear**.
- OSCE calls to allow **qualified citizen observers and international experts** to verify the system and audits.
→ *Risk: opaque process and declining public trust. *
**7. Unfinished Legal Framework for Verifiability**
- Estonia’s system lacks **clear legal provisions** for:
* *Individual verifiability* (a voter can check their own vote),
* *Universal verifiability* (independent observers can confirm tally integrity),
* and *coercion-resistance*.
→ *Risk: unverifiable election results despite technical claims of integrity. *
**8. No Specific Complaint and Sanction Mechanisms**
- There are **no dedicated legal procedure** for complaints related to internet-voting
- OSCE recommends establishing a **complaint process and criminal provisions** addressing online vote fraud.
→ *Risk: lack of remedies for technical or procedural violations. *
**9. Over-reliance on Technical Agencies and Private Vendors**
- The Information System Authority (RIA) and private companies play major roles, but
**responsibilities and accountability lines are blurred**.
- The NEC should retain *clear supervisory authority** and all control over the
→ *Risk: unclear liability if system errors or breaches occur. *
**10. Deficient Public Communication and Expert Inclusion**
- Internet-voting principles and constitutional interpretation have **not been discussed publicly or academically**.
- OSCE stresses the need for **open expert debates** and explanations understandable to the
→ *Risk: low transparency and eroding confidence in the system. *
—
### � Overall Assessment
While recognizing Estonia’s leadership in e-voting, ODIHR concludes that:
- “Internet voting cannot fully and simultaneously satisfy all electoral principles. Balancing secrecy, universality, and equality requires continuous, transparent dialogue and legal ”
In short: **technically advanced, but democratically fragile** — Estonia’s system needs stronger legal clarity, auditability, and public accountability to meet international standards.
