Avaleht Esileht Does The Islamic NATO Also Have The RSF, Ethiopia, And/Or Somaliland In...

Does The Islamic NATO Also Have The RSF, Ethiopia, And/Or Somaliland In Its Sights?

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Saudi Arabia’s Pakistani and Turkish allies, all three of which are part of the Mecca Pact that’s popularly known as the Islamic NATO, agreed to the “rapid deployment” of their “military forces and capabilities” to the Kingdom amidst the Saudi-led counteroffensive against the Houthis by Riyadh’s local allies. It was assessed last month that “The Houthis’ Power Play Exposed The Hollowness Of The Islamic NATO”, but that conclusion might now need to be reconsidered depending on Pakistan and Turkiye’s next moves.

Reuters recently reported that Pakistan sent equipment to Riyadh’s local allies in Yemen and that its military advisors are on the ground with their Saudi counterparts. The Kingdom has also reportedly deployed Turkish drones over Yemen. That might remain the extent of those two’s involvement in the conflict, but regardless of whatever happens next in this respect, the “rapid deployment” of their “military forces and capabilities” to the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea (GARS) region is significant for Africa.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar recently claimed that more than six countries want to join the Islamic NATO. While some have speculated that more West Asian countries and perhaps even Bangladesh might soon join, it can’t be ruled out that Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia might be next or at least request the Islamic NATO’s military aid. Egypt is already close to all three founding members and just expanded its de facto regional alliance with Eritrea and Somalia to include Sudan.

This Cairo-led bloc is considered to be aimed against its historical rival Ethiopia, which is crushing the rebels who recently initiated the Second Northern Conflict that Addis blames on Egypt, Eritrea, and Sudan. As was explained here, Sudan accuses Ethiopia of backing the RSF rebels, Eritrea is spinning any Ethiopian counteroffensive into its territory as an “unprovoked invasion”, and Somalia resents Ethiopia’s strategic partnership with de facto independent Somaliland that Mogadishu still claims as its own.

Pakistan and Turkiye have also expanded their military ties with Sudan and Somalia. Pakistan was reportedly negotiating an over $1 billion arms deal with Sudan earlier this year and then signed a defense MoU with Somalia over the summer. As for Turkiye, it’s reportedly cooperating closely with Egypt in Sudan and deployed F-16s to Somalia on anti-terrorist grounds. The deployment of their forces to the GARS region could presage their use against the RSF, Ethiopia, and/or Somaliland in the future.

This could happen as a “show of force” regardless of their direct involvement in Yemen, upon Egypt joining the Islamic NATO then requesting such aid, or all four (Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia with Djibouti possibly joining too for good measure to include the entire southern GARS coast) joining to this end. The Houthis are much stronger than the RSF and Somaliland, so any successful operation against them could lead to ones against those two, but Ethiopia is many times stronger than all three combined.

Therefore, the Islamic NATO might not intend to attack Ethiopia if its counteroffensive crosses into Eritrea, or at least Ethiopia’s close Turkish and Saudi partners might be reluctant to do so while Pakistan’s “hired guns” are a different story. In that scenario, the bloc’s rapid build-up in the GARS region could be a bluff for “deterring” Ethiopia, but it could also still precede direct involvement against the RSF and/or especially Somaliland even if only as a “show of force” (to “save face” if the Houthis humble them?).

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