The Washington Post (WaPo) published an article this week about how “Document prepared for Kremlin outlines hard-line negotiating stance”, which purports to be based off of an unnamed FSB-linked think tank’s report from early February that was published before the Riyadh talks. Since the alleged report itself wasn’t included in their article, nor even was the name of the think tank that supposedly produced it, it’s impossible to determine its veracity. In any case, here’s what the author(s) suggested:
* Prioritize normalizing Russian-US relations;
* Propose US access to Donbass’ rare earth minerals;
* Agree not to station Oreshniks in Belarus if the US doesn’t station new systems in Europe;
* Stop arms supplies to states “unfriendly” to the US if the US stops arms supplies to Ukraine;
* Exacerbate the US’ tensions with both China and the EU;
* Rule out a resolution of the conflict until 2026 at the earliest;
* Completely dismantle the current Ukrainian government;
* Insist on official recognition of Russian control over the new regions;
* Carve out buffer zones in northeastern and southwestern Ukraine (Odessa is specifically mentioned);
* Oppose any, including non-Western, peacekeeping plans;
From the above, the modus operandi appears to be getting on the US’ good side through diplomacy and economic deals while simultaneously working to worsen the US’ relations with the two other Great Powers that are most interested in this conflict, China and the EU. It’s unclear how the second part could be achieved since information warfare has very real limits in this respect, but anyhow, these approaches are meant to facilitate political (government dismantlement) and security (buffer zone) goals in Ukraine.
About those goals, they’ll require sustained military pressure to have any chance of succeeding, ergo the proposal to rule out resolving the conflict until 2026 at the earliest. This takes for granted that Russia will continue to advance and that Trump won’t “escalate to de-escalate”, which could take the form of threatening to deploy US troops in its most dramatic manifestation, to coerce a compromise. The assumption is that Trump might pump Ukraine with weapons at the most but that this won’t stop Russia.
A related assumption is that the international community will officially recognize Russian control over the new regions and that all peacekeeping plans, including non-Western ones, will be thwarted. There’s little that Russia can realistically do to convince nearly 200 countries to align their policy with its own on this very sensitive issue while it would have to be willing to bomb foreign forces, including non-Western ones, to foil any peacekeeping plans. All of this therefore comes off as wishful thinking.
To be sure, the preceding proposals might hypothetically be implemented, but they’re premised on a combination of luck and assumptions. This doesn’t mean that they’re impossible, just that they’re unlikely without a clearly defined path, and none exists according to WaPo’s review of this mysterious think tank report. Having said that, assuming for the sake of argument that the document is real, some parts of it are pragmatic and could help advance the more ambitious parts if Russia plays its cards right.
For instance, normalizing relations with the US, clinching strategic resource deals with it, and agreeing to the missile and arms quid pro quos could forge the trust required to discuss the other goals. Trump might then be much more amenable to Russia’s proposal for completely dismantling the current Ukrainian government, which is a cesspool of corruption connected to his Democrat enemies, and discussing demilitarized buffer zones such as the “Trans-Dnieper” one that was proposed here.
In the event that both are achieved, then the need for peacekeepers could disappear since the new Ukrainian government wouldn’t be revanchist and the buffer zones could deter any future one from trying to reconquer their country’s lost territory, thus meeting the hardliners’ reported goals. For that to happen, however, Russia must negotiate with the US in good faith instead of exploiting diplomacy to buy time for military gains like that mysterious think tank strongly implied that it should do.
Therein lies the main reason why WaPo’s report about that unnamed institute’s proposals should be treated skeptically since it coincidentally conforms with Bloomberg’s report from earlier in the week alleging that Putin isn’t sincere about peace talks. These narratives discredit him and his diplomats while lending credence to Western warmongers’ plans to “escalate to de-escalate” right now in order to “force Russia to peace” instead of “wasting time” with “doomed-to-fail” peace talks.
While there might indeed be some Russian hardliners who think that peace talks should just be a ruse for buying time to make more military gains, such attitudes don’t reflect the Kremlin’s, yet WaPo tried to misportray that mysterious think tank’s report as something worth taking seriously. They might have also omitted some of its contents too since it’s suspicious that they didn’t link to or publish the document that they reported on, which would have preemptively dispelled questions about their reporting.
The public is therefore misled to believe such things as Russia not wanting to end this conflict until next year at the earliest, that it’s stirring trouble in the US’ ties with China and the EU, and that it might even oppose peacekeepers from friendly non-Western countries like China and India. It’s therefore easy to see why some might question WaPo’s reporting, but even if these and the other proposals really were put forth, it doesn’t mean that they’ll be applied or that they represent the government’s official policy.
To conclude, while the hardliners’ reportedly envisaged endgame in Ukraine represents the best-case scenario for Russia, the actual outcome will likely see some compromises being made on these goals since it’ll be very difficult to accomplish them all. Moreover, Putin and his closest advisors are considered to be so-called “moderates” so they’re already disinclined to support “hardline” policies, thus raising the odds of diplomacy leading to a negotiated settlement possibly by year’s end.
