The Washington Post (WaPo) published a piece on Wednesday about how “Ukraine’s east buckling under improved Russian tactics, superior firepower” to coincide with Russia’s capture of the strategic Ukrainian fortress town of Ugledar at the junction of the Donbass and Zaporozhye fronts. According to them, Russia is now relying on assault teams as small as four soldiers each in order to evade drone surveillance. It also has much more equipment than Ukraine and is able to better coordinate its attacks as well.
An anonymous officer from the 72nd Mechanized Brigade that fought in Ugledar “for about two years with no relief” told them that “artillery volleys in the area sometimes reach 10 shells to 1 in favor of Russia and glide bombs launched unopposed from jets can destroy whole sections of a trench line and anyone manning them.” WaPo added that Ukraine still struggles to replenish its losses and has been distracted by its invasion of Russia’s Kursk Region, the latter outcome of which was predictable.
Another interesting tidbit from their report is that “The destruction of railways and bridges (around Pokrovsk) means it is effectively lost”. Readers can learn more about how that city’s capture can be a game-changer for the Donbass front from this analysis here, but it’s also significant that Russia is finally targeting Ukraine’s military logistics. It still won’t touch bridges across the Dnieper nor any of the railways connecting Ukraine to Poland, but at least it’s finally destroying those near the front.
While none of these tactics are novel, it’s the first time that they’ve been employed by Russia, let alone altogether. Dropping “meat assaults” in favor of small assault teams was long overdue, as was bombing Ukrainian trenches and targeting its military logistics near the front line. Russia has always been far ahead in the “race of logistics”/“war of attrition”, but it’s only just now doing something other than relying on brute force by finally devising more effective ways to leverage this advantage.
To paraphrase the famous saying, “Russians saddle slow but ride fast”, so it’s possible that everything might soon accelerate as a result of Russia finally adopting these tactics. The question still remains, however, about why it took so long to make these improvisations. This delay entailed enormous costs. The most likely explanation is that its armed forces didn’t have viable feedback loops until recently. Inaccurate portrayals of the front-line situation might also have mudded the command’s perceptions.
The combination of these two accounts for why it took so long for Russia to implement what its supporters have been wanting it to do for a while. These problems aren’t exclusive to its armed forces though since they plague Russia in general. It’s not uncommon for someone to tell their superiors what they think they want to hear instead of sharing brutal truths with them. Likewise, superiors rarely feel comfortable acknowledging that their plans aren’t working, hence why they don’t often seek feedback.
Sharing unsolicited advice is considered deeply offensive because it’s seen as questioning a superior’s judgement and is therefore almost always discarded. Constructive critiques are far and few between, which creates an echo chamber that contributes to groupthink and the creation of an alternative reality. This delays much-needed reforms since those responsible for ordering them don’t even know that they’re needed until problems become too serious to be denied or ignored by those below them.
Accountability doesn’t usually follow reforms either since those who denied or ignored the problems that gave rise to them are rarely punished, let alone let go from their positions. They simply plead ignorance or find scapegoats, either of which usually satisfies their superiors. These same superiors also don’t often decide to create feedback loops or improve whatever existing ones they have after ordering reforms to be made since groupthink has deluded them into thinking that no systemic problems exist.
The preceding paragraphs are admittedly harsh, but they explain why “Russians saddle slow”, whether in terms of bureaucracy, business, diplomacy, military affairs, or whatever else. They only begin to “ride fast” once superiors realize that systemic problems exist and require reforms to resolve, after which the “power verticals” that Russia is known for kick into gear due to discipline and fear of further upsetting the angry superior. Something of the sort might finally be happening with the special operation.
