Ukraine has no realistic chance of joining the EU anytime soon since it doesn’t meet the bloc’s criteria, but another obstacle has unexpectedly emerged, and that’s the Volhynia Genocide dispute with Poland. Kiev refuses to recognize the World War II-era slaughter of over 100,000 ethnic Poles in that region and Eastern Galicia as genocide and has dragged its feet on exhuming the victims’ remains. This issue catapulted back to the forefront of their ties after its Foreign Minister’s provocative comments last week.
“Kuleba Equated Ukraine’s Genocide Of Poles With Poland’s Forcible Resettlement Of Ukrainians” when attempting to deflect from a question about this, which provoked the indignation of so many Poles that their German-backed Ukrainophile Prime Minister felt forced to condemn what he said. Tusk described it as “unequivocally negative” and pledged that “Ukraine, one way or another, will have to meet Poland’s expectations” on this issue.
The irony though is that Tusk oversaw the signing of a Polish-Ukrainian security pact over the summer that included a controversial clause about standardizing their historical curricula, which was analyzed at the time as implying that Poland planed to whitewash the genocide that it commemorates yearly. The only reason why he’s now demanding historical justice is because he fears that trying to sweep the issue under the rug after Kuleba’s comments could harm his party ahead of next year’s presidential elections.
Sejm Speaker Holownia, whose party forms part of the ruling liberal-globalist coalition, said what Tusk is unable to for the aforesaid ‘politically correct’ reasons by declaring that Ukraine should still become a member of the EU even without first resolving the Volhynia Genocide dispute. He instead proposed that they continue talks on this “in the safe ecosystem of the European Union.” His views are unpopular and represent the Ukrainophile fringe, though this force has nonetheless become very influential since 2022.
Ukraine is unlikely to comply with Poland’s demands after Zelensky decided earlier this year to tacitly revive the short-lived “Ukrainian People’s Republic’s” territorial claims as part of an ultra-nationalist push amidst growing resistance to forcible conscription and continued losses in Donbass. Although this was with the intent of rallying the population against Russia, that erstwhile entity also laid claim to the modern-day Polish territory from which its co-ethnics were later forcibly resettled as explained here.
“Operation Vistula” was also referenced by Kuleba in his earlier cited deflection when being asked about the Volhynia Genocide. The historical memory of Ukraine’s claims to those territories within Poland’s post-World War II borders is now fresh in its people’s minds, and having “accepted” the “ethnic cleansing” of their people there (as they see it), they’re now less likely to “accept” responsibility for the Volhynia Genocide. Doing so would amount to a refutation of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism.
The radical school of thought that predominates considers the “Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists” and their “Ukrainian Insurgent Army” to be “freedom fighters”, but Poland considers them to be a terrorists due to their crimes during the interwar period and the Second World War. From Kiev’s perspective, however, they fought for “freedom from Polish occupation” after Warsaw came to control the “West Ukrainian People’s Republic” and northwestern part of the “Ukrainian People’s Republic”.
Poland obtained these territories after the Polish-Bolshevik War and regarded them as rightfully its own due to seeing itself the heir of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that used to lord over them. The result of these diverging viewpoints was that some Ukrainians resorted to terrorism in the name of “national liberation” while the Second Polish Republic responded with a forcible “pacification” campaign. These developments then set the stage for the Volhynia Genocide during World War II.
Accordingly, each side’s perspective on this has become an integral part of their modern-day national identities, thus making it a zero-sum dispute since one side must surrender in order to resolve it. No middle ground is possible, and while Poland holds all the cards and is therefore able to indefinitely perpetuate this dispute until Ukraine gives in to its demands, hubristic geopolitical and economic considerations will likely influence its elite to give in to Ukraine’s demands instead.
Therein lies the reason why many Poles are concerned about this issue catapulting back to the forefront of their relations since they fear that their elite will sell out the Volhynia Genocide victims for these reasons. Tusk is talking tough right now while everyone is so enraged, but the previously mentioned clause that he agreed to include in this summer’s Polish-Ukrainian security pact about standardizing their historical curricula suggests that he isn’t serious about keeping Ukraine out of the EU over this issue.
As was written in the introduction, that country has no realistic chance of joining the bloc anytime soon, but this debate and popular suspicions about their elite’s possibly impending betrayal of the Volhynia Genocide victims speaks to how sensitive this issue is within Polish society at large. Tusk isn’t entirely to blame for this though since his (very imperfect) conservative-nationalist predecessors could have made military and economic aid to Ukraine contingent on first resolving this dispute on Poland’s terms.
They never even considered that though since they were blinded by hubristic geopolitical and economic considerations just like their liberal-globalist successors are despite the latter now feigning patriotism solely due to domestic pressure ahead of next year’s presidential elections. The Polish people therefore can’t depend on either of their country’s two leading parties to defend historical justice in the Volhynia Genocide dispute, which Ukraine is keenly aware of and is why it might ultimately end up getting its way.
