Bloomberg cited unnamed “people with knowledge of Kremlin thinking” to report that Russia will only demand that Ukraine restore its constitutional neutrality, “drastically cut back military ties with the NATO alliance”, limit its army, and freeze the front lines, albeit with some territorial swaps. Also, “The Kremlin’s position is that while individual NATO members may continue to send arms to Ukraine under bilateral security agreements, any such weapons should not be used against Russia or to recapture territory.”
To be sure, Bloomberg might have either invented their sources or they’re uninformed of what the Kremlin thinks, but there’s also the possibility that they’re accurately reflecting what it plans to ask for during peace talks. Hopefully Russia’s demands of Ukraine are more than what Bloomberg just reported, however, because the aforesaid requests would be settling for much less than it might otherwise be able to achieve as suggested by some of the proposals made at the end of this analysis here.
For instance, any agreement to limit the Ukrainian Armed Forces is meaningless without a monitoring mission paired with credible enforcement mechanisms to enforce compliance. After all, even written guarantees that individual NATO members won’t arm Ukraine for the purpose of using these weapons against Russia or to recapture territory – not to mention purely verbal ones – could be broken. There’s also the question of how Russia would respond to future drone and missile strikes from Ukraine.
The most realistic way to address these concerns is through the participation of only non-Western countries in monitoring and peacekeeping roles, the latter of which could concern deployment along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, including the Line of Contact (LOC). About the second-mentioned, the reported territorial swaps could see Russia give back its part of Kharkov Oblast in exchange for Ukraine giving back its part of Kursk Oblast, which each would formally retain their territorial claims to the other.
This would restore the status quo ante bellum along that part of their universally recognized frontier while serving as a legal workaround against their respective constitutional prohibitions on ceding territory, which in Russia’s case is absolute while Ukraine’s requires a national referendum. Accordingly, freezing the LOC through an armistice a la the Korean precedent wouldn’t violate either of their laws, thus retaining Ukraine’s claims to the entirety of its pre-2014 borders and Russia’s to its post-2022 ones.
As for effectively keeping the peace, Russia could be more confidently assured that Ukraine won’t unilaterally violate the armistice with Western encouragement if the proposed non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping contingent is allowed to inspect all trains and cars that cross the Dnieper eastward. Ukraine might undertake a long-term clandestine campaign to rebuild its heavy weaponry presence in proximity to the DMZ ahead of a possible sneak attack so this would be imperative for impeding that.
Likewise, since such equipment could also be smuggled across the river, these forces should also be given the means for patrolling it as well as the right to detain people, seize their contraband, and use lethal force if they come under attack. Kiev should have a special regime since it’s difficult to enforce such checks given the capital’s location on both sides of the river, but one possibility is fencing off its northeastern, eastern, and southeastern reaches beyond the city’s limits and conducting checks there.
The ideal scenario should be to demilitarize everything east of the Dnieper and north of the LOC that remains under Kiev’s formal control, the so-called “Trans-Dnieper” region for lack of a better description, while having its DMZ manned by Russia’s closest non-Western partners. The first part of this suggestion would prevent Ukraine from unilaterally violating the armistice while the second would do the same with regards to Russia since it would be loath to attack Indian and other such friendly peacekeepers.
This proposal takes for granted that NATO will continue expanding its influence in Western Ukraine along that side of the Dnieper, but the river will serve as a major obstacle to on-the-ground offensive action by either party, all while they presumably concentrate air defense systems up and down its banks. It’s unrealistic to expect Russia to plant boots its boots on the NATO-Ukrainian border, monitor everything that crosses, and then hold these positions indefinitely as explained here so this is the next best solution.
In the event that Russia or Ukraine detects illegal military activity by the other in the Trans-Dnieper region such as prohibited arms and special forces, then they should already have a protocol agreed upon as part of their armistice for peacefully addressing this prior to resorting to kinetic action if that fails. This could include a formal complaint with evidence, tasking the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission with investigating, and in the worst-case scenario, drone or missile strikes against those targets.
On-the-ground military activity by either party would be strictly prohibited since that would violate the terms of the armistice and instantly risk another conflict, ergo the purpose of the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission along the DMZ, the Dnieper, and around Eastern Kiev for deterring this. There could also be previously agreed and very severe economic, financial, and other consequences from Western and non-Western countries that would immediately enter into effect if that happens.
Basically, the Trans-Dnieper region would function as a no-man’s land or buffer zone, and the locals who feel uncomfortable living there could either relocate elsewhere in Ukraine such as west of the Dnieper or take advantage of Russia’s simplified procedure from summer 2022 for moving eastward instead. As can be seen, the proposal for a demilitarized Trans-Dnieper region that would be monitored and maintained by non-Western peacekeepers would greatly keep the pace, hence why Russia must demand it.
Any armistice or peace treaty that doesn’t include this outcome risks being unilaterally violated by Ukraine with Western encouragement after some time. Its terms, especially those involving severe multidimensional consequences against whichever party sends ground forces into this zone (though importantly not for carrying out surgical strikes), should also reassure the West that Russia won’t violate this deal either. That’s why the US would do well to seriously consider this proposal if Russia brings it up.
Should Russia settle for less by only demanding what Bloomberg reported, then it would be tacitly requesting nothing more than a temporary lull in hostilities to prepare for the next inevitable phase of the conflict. Officially speaking, Russia remains determined to reach a lasting peace that preferably meets as many of its maximum goals as is realistically possible given the new circumstances in which it now finds itself after over 1,000 days of conflict, so it should be receptive to the Trans-Dnieper proposal.
