Most observers missed last week’s European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defense despite its importance. Article 15 “stresses that the East Shield and Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the East”, both of which are tied to Poland, while other articles loosen financial restrictions for investing in defense. Polish Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz praised the resolution on both counts.
For those who aren’t aware, Poland’s East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line are complementary projects that aim to build a series of high-tech fortifications along these four countries’ shared borders with Russia and Belarus, hence why they’re considered by some to be a single megaproject. Finland’s related border defense plans are oftentimes grouped together with them to expand its sense of scale as running from the Arctic to Central Europe. Here are four background briefings to bring readers up to speed:
* 22 January 2024: “The ‘Baltic Defense Line’ Is Meant To Accelerate The German-Led ‘Military Schengen’”
* 13 May 2024: “Poland’s Border Fortification Buildup Has Nothing To Do With Legitimate Threat Perceptions”
* 25 May 2024: “A New Iron Curtain Is Being Built From The Arctic To Central Europe”
* 28 June 2024: “The ‘EU Defense Line’ Is The Latest Euphemism For The New Iron Curtain”
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk foresaw last week’s resolution earlier in the month when he declared that “The Shield East, which is not solely a Polish project after Finnish and Baltic involvement in it, as well the EU’s eastern border, have become a priority and are no more questioned.” This came just several days after European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen unveiled the bloc’s “ReArm Europe Plan”, part of which includes offering members €150 billion worth of loans for defense investments.
It was with all this in mind that Tusk said the day after the resolution’s passing following his meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara that responsibility for Poland’s eastern border plans should be shared by the EU and NATO. He also suggested that they consider this border to be a “common” one in order for it to then be “easier for us to finance and organize this” initiative. Tusk’s de facto request for more European financing and foreign troops was made in the context explained below:
* 19 February 2025: “Poland Is Once Again Poised To Become The US’ Top Partner In Europe”
* 6 March 2025: “France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe”
* 14 March 2025: “France’s Next Quarterly Nuclear Drills Might Become Prestige-Building Exercises With Poland”
* 15 March 2025: “Poland’s Talk About Obtaining Nukes Is Likely A Misguided Negotiation Tactic With The US”
Poland is at a geostrategic crossroads amidst the nascent Russian–US “New Détente” whereby it can either remain a stalwart American ally despite its misgivings about the rapid Russian-US rapprochement, rely more on France to balance the US, or pivot away from the US towards France. The outcome of May’s presidential election will likely determine which way it goes since a conservative or populist victory would raise the odds of the first or second scenarios while a liberal-globalist one would raise the third’s.
Tusk is essentially seeking to secure more European financing and foreign troops before the elections so as to ensure that the next president feels pressured by precedent into relying more on France to balance the US than remaining a stalwart American ally if they’re not from his party. From the conservative and populist perspectives, it’s a net positive to have more stakeholders in Polish security as long as Poland doesn’t have to cede any more of its sovereignty, so they might appreciate what Tusk has achieved.
