Niger repealed a 2015 law late last month that was aimed at curbing illegal immigration to Europe via Libya, which Al Jazeera hinted could turn Agadez – the Saharan city that it wrote was previously labelled “Africa’s smuggling capital” and later “Europe’s border guard” – into a center of such activity once more. The de facto dismantlement of this outpost preceded Niger’s decision earlier this month to end its defense and security partnerships with the bloc, thus raising concern about what might come next.
Moreover, the last-mentioned development came right around the time that the Russian Deputy Defense Minister visited that country’s capital and reached an agreement to bolster related ties between them. This led Le Monde, one of the most prominent outlets from Niger’s former French colonizer, to conclude that “Niger chooses Russia over Europe”. As all this was happening, September’s Sahelian Alliance of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger also decided to create a confederation.
These fast-moving events are the direct consequence of Niger’s coup over the summer that deposed its French-backed leader and almost led to a regional war after Nigerian-led ECOWAS threatened to invade. That scenario was averted due to deft American diplomacy after Acting Deputy Secretary of State Nuland apparently reached a deal with the interim authorities to call off the operation in exchange for letting the US retain its two bases in the country. Readers can learn more about how everything unfolded here.
As it presently stands, the EU’s so-called “forward defense” against illegal immigration is now in joint Sahelian-Russian-US hands after the bloc lost all of its influence over Niger in the span of just several months. Accordingly, those three actors – the first two of whom are informally allied via Russia’s series of bilateral security partnerships – now function as “Europe’s new border guard”, which bestows each with outsized influence over those more than two dozen countries across the Mediterranean.
Of them all, Niger has the most power due to its location as was explained in the introduction, thus meaning that it could unleash a flood of illegal immigrants into Europe should it choose to employ so-called “Weapons of Mass Migration” (WMM). Nevertheless, there’s no reason to suspect that it has any such intentions despite repealing its 2015 law. That move was likely a hybrid populist-pragmatic measure aimed at generating more support for the interim authorities and reopening valuable smuggling lines.
After all, the country still remains blockaded by Nigeria, through which many of its imports previously passed. It therefore makes sense that Niger would repeal this legislation as a form of pressure relief out of economic desperation, though the inevitable consequence is that more illegal migration will likely occur as a result despite that not being the intent. About that, the US and Russia could help their partner control these flows, each for their own reasons.
Washington wants to show Brussels that it can ensure the bloc’s unconventional security via the military bases that it still has in “Europe’s former border guard”, while Moscow wants to show the world that it’s a responsible player so as to discredit claims to the contrary from the West. This convergence of narrative-strategic interests will probably curb any large-scale illegal migration through Niger en route to the EU via Libya and the Mediterranean in the coming future.
Niamey’s interests are also served through these means since its interim authorities hope to legitimize their rule by obtaining some recognition from the West, which another 2015-like migrant crisis would preclude, hence why they’re expected to rely on American and Russian support for preventing this. In the worst-case scenario that none of them can control these flows, then the EU might feel pressured to launch its own counter-migrant military intervention in the region, whether directly and/or via ECOWAS.
The same logic applies if Niger “goes rogue” and decides to employ WMM against Washington’s wishes, in which event the West would predictably accuse it of “doing Russia’s Hybrid War bidding” like they accused Belarus of doing during the 2021 migrant crisis to justify a comprehensive pressure campaign. They’re unlikely to do that though since the interim authorities only narrowly averted a regional some months ago and are still struggling to manage the economic catastrophe caused by Nigeria’s blockade.
Regardless of whatever happens, the EU’s “forward defense” against illegal immigration is now in others’ hands, two of whom (the Sahelian Confederation and Russia) regard the bloc as an enemy while the last (the US) is a “frenemy” that’s worked against its interests before. The EU’s stakes in the Sahel have therefore never been higher, nor its position more vulnerable, which further erodes these countries’ sovereignty since their unconventional security can no longer be ensured as confidently as before.
