The latest Sudanese Civil War that’s been raging for over a year already created further complications to the implementation of 2020’s agreement on setting up a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, which were previously impeded by October 2021’s military coup. Then came the news earlier this year that Sudan was secretly arming Ukraine and even hosting its mercenaries, who reportedly fight against allegedly Wagner-backed rebels, all of which served to reduce confidence in Russia’s naval base plans even more.
Amidst this uncertainty, some speculated that Russia was exploring a naval base in neighboring Eritrea, but this analysis here explained why their first-ever joint exercises earlier this year shouldn’t be seen that way. Meanwhile, this analysis here argued that nearby Somaliland would be a more suitable alternative to Sudan, while this one here explained why Yemen might be even better. Be that as it may, it just turned out that Russia’s naval base plans in Sudan might soon come to fruition, albeit at a lesser scale.
Member of the military-led Sovereign Council Lt. Gen. Yasir al-Atta told Saudi Arabia’s Al-Hadath TV that “Russia proposed military cooperation through a logistical support centre, not a full military base, in return for urgent weapons and ammunition supplies. We agreed to this but suggested expanding the cooperation to include economic aspects like agricultural ventures, mining partnerships, and port development. Russia agreed to this broader scope.”
He added that “A military delegation is scheduled to depart for Moscow shortly, followed by a ministerial delegation led by the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council, Malik Agar. Upon the conclusion of the talks, the Chairman of the Sovereign Council will finalize a comprehensive agreement.” His words inspire optimism that the reportedly planned downgrading of Russia’s naval base in Sudan to a “logistical support centre” might indeed be implemented, though obstacles still of course remain.
For instance, the continued absence of a civilian government could prove a legal hurdle in terms of ratifying the agreement, which was one of the excuses for why the previous one hasn’t yet been fulfilled. Additionally, even though the latest plans only concern a “fuel supply point” as publicly financed Sputnik described it in their report about al-Atta’s words and he himself said that Sudan is open to hosting other countries’ such facilities, the US will almost certainly try to stir up some trouble over this issue.
It’s unclear exactly what they’d do to pressure the military government into reconsidering this deal or indefinitely delaying its implementation, but sanctions threats and speculative support for the rebels could be in the cards, as could incentives like corrupt dealings with that country’s leadership. The US’ interests are in keeping Russia out of Sudan and the broader Red Sea-Gulf of Aden region in general, and it’s much easier to apply pressure against Sudan in this respect than against Somaliland and even Yemen.
Moreover, it also can’t be ruled out that Sudan hopes that the US will compete with Russia for a naval facility of some sort and could thus give it better offers on all the economic aspects that its delegations plan to discuss during their forthcoming trips to Moscow. To be sure, the details that al-Atta revealed signal serious intent on his country’s part, but that’s not to say that they couldn’t scale back some of their commitments under a combination of American pressure and especially even better incentives.
Sudan’s interests are in multi–aligning between the Golden Billion, the Sino-Russo Entente, and the Global South in the New Cold War following India’s lead, though this is easier said than done for most countries, let alone one that’s suffering from a fierce civil war. It’s a positive development that two delegations soon plan to visit Moscow to finalize this new naval deal even though it’s a downgraded version of the original one, though it’s unclear whether they’ll ultimately see it through to the end.
