Brazilian President Lula ominously warned that his Russian counterpart would be arrested if he accepts the planned invitation to participate in next year’s G20 Summit in Rio in person. In his words, “It’s a judicial decision (whether Putin arrested per the ICC’s warrant). A president of the republic does not judge judicial decisions, he complies or doesn’t comply. Putin is invited to the G20 in Brazil, to the BRICS in Brazil. And if he attends, he knows what will happen. It may happen or it may not happen.”
There’s nothing new in what he said since it simply echoes his flip-flopping from early September where he first promised that “What I can say to you is that if I’m president of Brazil, and he comes to Brazil, there’s no way he will be arrested” only to clarify shortly after that it’s ultimately the judiciary’s decision. Although some interpreted his supplementary criticism of the ICC at the time as hinting at a desire to suspend participation in the Rome Statute, his latest remarks indicate that he has no such intentions.
Rather, he’s content to leave everything up to the US-influenced judiciary, which seals President Putin’s fate if he dares to step onto Brazilian soil next year. This also isn’t anything new either since “Lula’s Foreign Minister Strongly Implied That Putin Will Be Arrested If He Comes To Brazil”. Nevertheless, many multipolar supporters might be surprised by this stance since there’s been a lot of disinformation about Lula’s foreign policy during his third term. The following analyses clarify where he stands on everything:
* 28 January: “Lula’s Recalibrated Multipolar Vision Makes Him Amenable To The US’ Grand Strategic Interests”
* 11 February: “Lula Sealed His Deal With The Devil By Condemning Russia During His Meeting With Biden”
* 24 February: “Lula Just Backstabbed Putin By Ordering Brazil To Vote Against Russia At The UN”
* 4 March: “The Latest Hybrid War On Brazil Is Being Waged By Putatively Pro-Lula Forces”
* 28 March: “Brazil’s Support For Investigating The Nord Stream Attack Doesn’t Mean That Lula Is Pro-Russian”
* 1 April: “The De-Dollarization Of Brazilian-Chinese Trade Sheds More Light On Lula’s Grand Strategy”
* 5 April: “The Meeting Between Lula’s Chief Foreign Policy Advisor & President Putin Was Very Important”
* 14 April: “Lula’s Planned Influence Network With The US Democrats Will Serve Liberal-Globalist Interests”
* 15 April: “Don’t Let Lula’s De-Dollarization Success Distract From His ‘Peace Club’ Failure”
* 16 April: “Debunking Lula’s Latest Lie That President Putin Supposedly Isn’t Interested In Peace”
* 16 April: “Brazil’s Abstention From 2014’s UNGA Vote On Ukraine Proves That Lula Changed The PT’s Policy”
* 19 April: “Lula’s Chief Foreign Policy Advisor Articulated His Boss’ Worldview In A Lengthy Interview”
* 23 April: “Lula Just Discredited Brazil’s Foreign Policy By Placing Conditions On His Visit To Russia”
* 11 May: “It’s Concerning That One Of Kiev’s Top Warmongers Was Pleased With Celso Amorim’s Visit”
* 22 May: “Zelensky Showed Lula Who’s Boss By Standing Him Up At The G7”
* 27 May: “Why Is Lula Presenting Himself As China & India’s Spokesman On The NATO-Russian Proxy War?”
* 3 June: “Celso Amorim’s Remarks To The Financial Times Aren’t As Russian-Friendly As Folks Think”
In brief, Lula’s worldview is more closely aligned with the ruling US Democrats’ liberal–globalist one than Russia’s conservative-nationalist one, though he’s also in favor of accelerating financial multipolarity just like the latter is. This explains why he condemned Russia in his joint statement with Biden and then ordered his diplomats to vote against it at the UN, all while refusing to arm Ukraine or sanction Russia. He’s not a US puppet, but also there’s no denying that he nowadays sometimes sides with it.
His reputation among the non-Western audience is that he’s a multipolar pioneer due to him co-founding BRICS, being a self-proclaimed socialist, and then ending up in jail as a result of the US’ Hybrid War on Brazil. Since being released, he moderated his foreign policy as proven in the enumerated list of analyses above, which is why the US’ ruling Democrats openly preferred him over his predecessor Bolsonaro during last year’s elections due to their newly aligned liberal-globalist worldview.
Lula’s supporters suppress any talk of these observations out of desperation to protect his reputation by smearing all those who share such facts. This gatekeeping accounts for why many multipolar supporters are unaware of his actual policy towards Russia, though they haven’t duped that country’s strategists. Since Lula can’t guarantee President Putin’s safety and might even want him to lure him to Brazil so that he can be arrested as a favor to the US, they’ll likely advise him against attending next year’s summit.
