A survey that was commissioned by the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita in early March revealed that a significant share of Poles doubt Trump’s reliability as an ally. 46.3% think that the US is now an unreliable guarantor of their country’s security, the view of which is shared by 56% of people with a higher education, 49% of women, 42% of men, and 52% of people over 50. Meanwhile, 32.7% still consider it reliable, while 20.39% have no opinion. This data was derived from polling 800 random internet users.
It’s connected to the nascent Russian–US “New Détente”, which has seen Trump signal his interest in entering into a series of pragmatic compromises with Putin aimed at restoring their countries’ relations, including at the expense of Ukraine’s interests from the Polish perspective. The results also suggest that Poland remains divided along partisan lines since the 46.3% of Poles who now consider the US to be an unreliable ally broadly reflects the share that supports the ruling liberal-globalist coalition.
This trend is a double-edged sword for the US. On the one hand, it’s sped up Poland’s efforts to assume a leading role in NATO amidst the US’ planned “Pivot (back) to Asia”, which will see the US disengage from the bloc. The US can therefore delegate more regional security responsibilities to Poland knowing that its expectations will be met. On the other hand, Poland is also now relying more on France to rebalance relations with the US, and a full-blown pivot can’t be ruled out. Here are five background briefings:
* 19 February: “Poland Is Once Again Poised To Become The US’ Top Partner In Europe”
* 6 March: “France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe”
* 14 March: “France’s Next Quarterly Nuclear Drills Might Become Prestige-Building Exercises With Poland”
* 15 March: “Poland’s Talk About Obtaining Nukes Is Likely A Misguided Negotiation Tactic With The US”
* 16 March: “The European Parliament Confirmed Poland’s Centrality To The Bloc’s Eastern Security Strategy”
From the standpoint of Trump 2.0’s interests, it’s best to reassure Poland in some symbolic way so that it doesn’t drift any closer to France in the security sense, which could take the form of declaring that no US troops will be withdrawn from Poland and that some from Germany might even be redeployed there too. Russia might predictably dislike that, but it’s arguably better from the perspective of its own interests that a newly friendly US retains its influence over Poland instead of a rogue France replacing it.
On that topic, France’s interests rest in elbowing Germany out of the competition for leadership of post-conflict Europe by aligning with Poland prior to turning it into a junior partner, albeit on better terms than Poland’s junior partnership with Germany that Prime Minister Tusk brought into being last year. As for Poland’s interests, these are understood differently by the ruling liberal-globalist coalition and the conservative and populist opposition, which aren’t one in the same but largely agree on this issue.
The liberals want to pivot towards France while the conservatives and populists are either content with relying on it to pragmatically rebalance relations with the US or remaining the US’ stalwart ally. The outcome of May’s presidential election, which will likely go to a second round on 1 June, will therefore greatly determine which scenario it ultimately pursues. The US has an interest in ensuring that the liberals lose, but if it lobbies too strongly for this, then they might rally the electorate around them.
