The New York Times reported on Saturday that a recent trip to Minsk by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State as part of the latest Russian-US prisoner swap could precede a Belarusian-US rapprochement. According to their sources, that official told Western diplomats that they’re exploring a “grand deal” whereby Lukashenko “would release a slew of political prisoners” in exchange for the US relaxing sanctions on his banks and potash exports, which could pair with the US’ latest diplomacy with Russia.
They quoted a relative of one of the most prominent imprisoned figures as suggesting that this arrangement could “loosen Belarus’s dependence on Russia and preserve some leverage for the U.S. and E.U.” Extrapolating on that potential imperative, another attempt could then be made to incentivize Lukashenko into drifting westward like he was prior to summer 2020’s failed Color Revolution, which might pressure Russia into being more flexible towards any compromises on Ukraine if he bites the bait.
Any improvement of Belarusian-US relations regardless of their motive would leave neighboring Poland in the lurch, however, since it’s been at the forefront of this Western regime change operation against Lukashenko. He then arguably responded to this unprovoked Hybrid War aggression by at the very least turning a blind eye towards civilizationally dissimilar illegal immigrants invading Poland from across their shared border. Tensions have since spiraled to their present nadir. Here are five background briefings:
* 13 May 2024: “Poland’s Border Fortification Buildup Has Nothing To Do With Legitimate Threat Perceptions”
* 2 June 2024: “Poland Can Defend Itself From Invading Illegal Immigrants Without Worsening Tensions With Russia”
* 19 July 2024: “Why’d Poland Rebuff Belarus’ Proposal To Resolve Their Border Problems?”
* 26 November 2024: “The West’s Next Anti-Russian Provocation Might Be To Destabilize & Invade Belarus”
* 30 January 2025: “Poland Won’t Send Troops To Belarus Or Ukraine Without Trump’s Approval”
Even though new Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth praised Poland as “the model ally on the continent” during his first European bilateral visit, Trump 2.0 is putting American interests first, not any single partner’s or group thereof like NATO’s. This is taking the form of prioritizing a peace deal with Russia over Ukraine that could then at minimum facilitate the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China and at maximum build a “new world order” with it. Here are three briefings about that:
* 13 February 2025: “Here’s What Comes Next After Putin & Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks”
* 14 February 2025: “Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West & How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?”
* 15 February 2025: “Vance’s Munich Speech Vindicated Putin’s Summer 2022 Prediction About Political Change In Europe”
The first scenario could result in a speedy ceasefire or armistice while the second could see Russia and the US joining forces, whether in general or on a case-by-case basis, to support a global populist-nationalist revolution aimed at bringing to power figures and movements that share their worldview. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski already hinted last month that the US might interfere in May’s presidential election via Musk personally and his X platform more broadly as was analyzed here.
The opposition “Law & Justice” (PiS) party is more socially conservative and pro-American than the ruling liberal-globalists from the “Civic Platform” (PO), who align a lot closer with Germany but still aren’t anti-American by any stretch. PiS was in power from 2015-2023, thus making them responsible for both summer 2020’s failed Color Revolution in Belarus and Poland’s continued support of anti-government militants afterwards as well as helping the UK sabotage spring 2022’s Russian-Ukrainian peace talks.
How all of this relates to May’s presidential election is that neither outgoing President Andrzej Duda’s replacement by fellow PiS member Karol Nawrocki nor PO member Rafal Trzaskowski will make any difference in terms of Polish-Belarusian ties since each of them practices pretty much the same policy. The only difference is that keeping PiS in the presidency amidst PO leader Donald Tusk’s tenure as premier (Poland has an odd ruling arrangement right now) will prevent the latter from changing society.
Neither electoral outcome though is expected to see Poland beat the US to the punch by patching up its problems with Belarus before the US does, which would objectively be the best course of action. Therefore, Poland will likely be forced to accept whatever the US agrees to with regard to Russia and/or Belarus instead of shaping circumstances in the direction of its national interests, such as prioritizing a rapprochement with Belarus and/or Russia in order to get ahead of the US and the EU in this respect.
What this means in practice is that Poland will continue being excluded from key regional developments just like how it was earlier excluded from last fall’s Berlin Summit between the German, American, British, and French leaders. Its ruling duopoly’s dreams of restoring Poland’s lost geopolitical glory through the creation of a regional sphere of influence will correspondingly remain nothing but delusions of grandeur made impossible by their lack of vision and loyal fealty to their foreign patrons’ interests.
