Lavrov shared some insight into his people’s character while speaking in early September at his alma mater, the Russian Foreign Ministry-run Moscow State Institute of International Relations, which is more popularly known across the world by its Russian abbreviation MGIMO. The first point of relevance that he made was that “Every time we make an agreement with someone, we do so guided by pragmatism. Certain emotions may be part of the deal from our side given the strength of our character.”
He then importantly added that “We love fairy tales and fables, and Russian literature, which teach us humanity. Pragmatism is, of course, always there. We do not cut any deals without pragmatism or a balance of interests.” His last point of insight into Russians’ character was when he said that “You know that it is part of our character too, I mean waiting for the crisis to start acting. Those of you who come from neighbouring countries feel the same way about life.”
All of this contextualizes Russia’s strategic culture, which refers to the way in which its diplomatic, expert, intelligence, and political bureaucracies see the world. It’s relevant for understanding how they interpret new information as well as formulate and implement policy, particularly that which relates to foreign policy and security. Reviewing what Lavrov revealed, Russians are pragmatic but sometimes optimistic to the point of implied naivete. They also tend not to proactively address latent crises.
With these traits in mind, it should be relatively easier for observers to understand why Russia was duped by the Minsk Accords, namely due to its relevant officials’ naivete-bordering optimism blinding them to the reality before their eyes all those years of the West arming Ukraine to the teeth. Accordingly, Russia “waited for the crisis to start acting”, meaning in this sense that it didn’t actively try to coerce Ukraine to implement the Minsk Accords till it caught wind of a planned offensive on Donbass.
Less significantly but no less relevant, this also explains why Russia put forth its security guarantee requests to the US and NATO in late 2021 despite the obviousness that they’d be rejected in hindsight. As Lavrov said, “We love fairy tales and fables, and Russian literature, which teach us humanity. Pragmatism is, of course, always there.” Russia accordingly thought that the West would prefer to cut a series of pragmatic deals with it that would humanely avert the impending conflict that it was signaling.
The part about how many of Russians “wait for the crisis to start acting” also explains why Russia didn’t try to avert Armenia’s gradual defection, Assad’s downfall in spite of the fragility of his government, and the latest Malian War sparked in part by Bamako rubbishing its deal with the Tuaregs 15 months prior. It’s also why Russia didn’t try to prevent the Viking Bloc, Poland, Turkiye, and Japan from assembling their “cordon sanitaire” in the Arctic-Baltic, Central Europe, the Eurasian Heartland, and Northeast Asia.
It goes without saying that Russians’ love of “fairy tales and fables” is a major reason why wishful thinking is still prevalent within its strategic culture despite Putin warning against this it in summer 2022. Be that as it may, it appears to have finally dawned on members of Russia’s pertinent bureaucracies that they need to change these aspects of their strategic culture, which could result in them fixing their broken feedback loops that are responsible for these problems of perception persisting into the present.
