The latest article that RT republished from the Valdai Club’s Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov is about the role that the Central & Eastern European states (described by him solely as “Eastern Europe”) on NATO’s Eastern Flank could play in reducing tensions and building a new security architecture. The key parts will first be quoted so that folks can review his understanding of them before describing the form that this could take if there’s will among all sides to implement a series of pragmatic moves to this end.
Lukyanov assessed that “more established countries with deeper traditions of statehood – Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania – are perfectly capable of recognizing the danger of being thrown under the bus of military escalation in pursuit of the broader objectives of the European establishment. This awareness doesn’t necessarily moderate their public rhetoric, but their practical behavior shows a certain degree of caution.”
He then wrote the following: “Until now, Russia has generally assumed that if any European countries eventually contribute to a settlement, they would be the continent’s other major powers, states large and secure enough not to define their policies primarily through fear of Russia. In a genuine military crisis, however, the logic could turn out to be the reverse, as the countries with the greatest reason to fear an uncontrolled confrontation may also have the greatest interest in preventing one.”
Lukyanov concluded that “Rationality doesn’t always prevail in international politics, but this doesn’t mean Russia should write off Eastern Europe as a lost cause – because the countries closest to a conflict may ultimately have the strongest reasons to keep it under control.” All of this is relevant to Poland, which envisages leading the Intermarium along NATO’s Eastern Flank. Its ruling liberals are plotting an escalation against Russia, but its conservative president has the final say as commander-in-chief.
He’s also pursuing a US-centric foreign policy in competition with the liberals’ EU-centric one, and despite being an ethnic Russophobe after slurring Russians last month, he pledged in writing in May 2025 before the second round of the presidential election not to deploy troops to Ukraine. Karol Nawrocki might therefore agree to a pragmatic series of moves requested of him by Trump following the latter’s talks with Putin about this for reducing tensions and building a new security architecture.
The proposal was detailed here, which can be summarized as parallel American and European NATO redeployments from the Baltic States to Poland if Russia draws down its forces in Belarus, which would create partial buffers that remain under their patrons’ nuclear umbrellas for deterrence purposes. This could also spark progress on Ukraine’s negotiated demilitarization to expand this buffer southwards. A basis for the new security architecture would therefore be established for building upon even further.
Essentially, Poland would lead NATO 3.0’s containment of Russia through the Intermarium, but the Baltic States, Belarus, and Ukraine would function as partial buffers between them for more effectively managing tensions as the US relatively disengages from Europe to prioritize the Asia-Pacific instead. For there to be any chance of this proposal succeeding, Putin must discuss it with Trump during an upcoming call, and it would also be a good idea to resume dialogue between Russia and Poland without delay too.
