Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia warned Israel of “certain political consequences” should it send some of its Patriots to Ukraine via the US like CNN recently reported is presently being negotiated between them. This comes amidst the gradual deterioration in their ties since Hamas’ sneak attack last year in spite of President Putin’s proud lifelong philo-Semitism that can be learned about more here. The following five pieces document the lead-up to this latest development:
* 25 January: “Russia Is Worried That Israeli Strikes Risk Drawing Syria Deeper Into The West Asian Conflict”
* 6 February: “The New Israeli Ambassador To Russia Is Totally Wrong About Moscow’s Regional Policy”
* 7 March: “Israel’s Partial Compliance With The US’ Anti-Russian Demands Risks Ruining Ties With Moscow”
* 19 April: “Russia’s Request For UNSC Sanctions Against Israel Is A Principled Soft Power Move”
* 7 June: “Who Might Russia Arm As An Asymmetrical Response To The West Arming Ukraine?”
To summarize, Israel began misportraying Russia’s balancing act in the latest conflict (the details of which can be read here) and flirting with the idea of sending early warning systems to Kiev, which prompted Russia to escalate its rhetoric against Israel and flirt with arming its Resistance Axis foes. Thus far, their spat has remained within the realm of mutual perceptions and rhetoric, but Israel’s potential arming of Ukraine with air defense systems could lead to a reciprocal Russian arming of the Resistance Axis.
The prerogative rests with Israel since it’s easier for it to indirectly arm Ukraine than it is for Russia to indirectly arm the Resistance Axis. Moreover, Netanyahu might calculate that sending defensive weapons there won’t cross Russia’s political red line but might earn him some relief from US pressure, which readers can learn more about here. It’s unclear whether he’ll go through with what CNN recently reported, but if he does, then Nebenzia hinted that Russia’s initial reaction will be political.
What he probably meant to signal was that his country might either host more Hamas delegations in the future, but this time to discuss bilateral ties instead of hostage releases like during prior visits since the latest conflict erupted, and/or order its media to decisively promote anti-Israeli narratives. They’ve been pretty balanced till now, but that could change if the decision is made. Another possibility is to let Syria finally use the S-300s to defend itself despite thus far denying it that right for de-escalation purposes:
* 10 October 2023: “Russia Is Unlikely To Let Syria Get Involved In The Latest Israeli-Hamas War”
* 22 October 2023: “Russia Isn’t Expected To Stop Israel’s Strikes In Syria”
* 27 October 2023: “Here’s Why Russia Didn’t Deter Or Respond To The US’ Latest Bombing Of Syria”
* 11 February 2024: “The Latest Israeli Bombing Of Syria Proves That Russia Won’t Risk A Wider War To Stop Tel Aviv”
* 11 April 2024: “Russia’s Syrian-Based Air Defenses Won’t Help Iran If Israel Responds To Its Retaliation”
Russia is unlikely to reverse course on this ultra-sensitive issue right away after having already provoked so much wrath from many of its supporters in the Alt-Media Community by keeping it in place for so long. Nevertheless, it still remains an appropriate reciprocal measure if Israel arms Ukraine, albeit one that it’s expected to hold off for now since there’s no going back once this authorization is given. In that event, bilateral ties wouldn’t recover for years, thus negating all of President Putin’s hard work on this.
That said, Russia does indeed seem to be losing patience with Israel, and the argument can be made that it has much more to gain by making this long-overdue move and solidifying its strategic ties with the Iranian-led Resistance Axis than it has to lose by clinging to hopes of a regional partnership with Israel. This school of thought was practically non-existent inside Russia’s policymaking communities prior to the latest conflict, but that just goes to show how much everything has changed since then.
The rise of a pro-Resistance policymaking faction parallels the rise of the pro-BRI one, which readers can learn more about here, and they’re practically one and the same due to their overlapping worldviews. Their respective rivals are the pro-Israeli and balancing/pragmatist faction, who are also practically one and the same in this regional context since they want to avert potentially disproportionate regional dependence on Iran by maintaining strategic ties with Israel, even though these are to Iran’s detriment.
While Russia is recalibrating its Asian strategy as explained here and thus appears to be putting a check on the pro-BRI faction’s hitherto astronomical expansion of influence, the pro-Resistance one could receive a pivotal boost if Israel sends its Patriots to Ukraine via the US. That might be the straw that proverbially breaks policymakers’ backs and gets them to throw their support behind this group’s policy recommendations, which could see Russia authorizing Syria to use the S-300s against Israel as explained.
To be clear, the pro-Resistance faction mostly exists only in Russia’s publicly financed international media and among their associates (including informal ones), with barely any influence within its think tanks although some there are warming up to their views. The pro-Israeli/balancing/pragmatist faction remains predominant and that’s why the current policy has remained in place for so long despite Israel’s repeated provocations that could have led to a policy change long ago if the political will was present.
This state of affairs could decisively change, however, if Israel indirectly arms Ukraine with its Patriots. Netanyahu and those around him might not realize what a game-changer that could be in terms of drastically changing Russia’s regional policy considering the way in which everything is increasingly being perceived by the Kremlin given the evolving context of the New Cold War. Israel should therefore think twice about this lest it risk catalyzing the worst-case scenario in relations with Russia.
