Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf told the BBC late last month that his country plans to offer Ethiopia “100% management for a port in the north, a new corridor that is already built” in Tadjoura in exchange for it scrapping January’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland. The last-mentioned deal was exploited by Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt as the pretext for tightening their containment noose around new BRICS member Ethiopia. Here are ten background briefings about this:
* 18 November 2023: “Frequently Asked Questions About Ethiopia’s Quest For Its Own Red Sea Port”
* 2 January 2024: “Ethiopia’s Port Deal With Somaliland Is A Diplomatic Masterstroke”
* 3 January 2024: “The Somalian Authorities & Al-Shabaab Are On The Same Side Against Ethiopia’s Somaliland Port Deal”
* 8 January 2024: “The Somali Leader Is Looking For Allies As He Plots Hybrid War Against Ethiopia & Somaliland”
* 15 January 2024: “Korybko To The Epoch Times: The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU Is Legitimate & Pragmatic”
* 22 January 2024: “Egypt Is Saber-Rattling Against Ethiopia To Distract From Its Betrayal Of The Palestinians”
* 2 February 2024: “Five Reasons For The World To Finally Recognize Somaliland’s 1991 Redeclaration Of Independence”
* 18 February 2024: “The Ethiopian Premier Made Three Solid Points About His Country’s Intentions Towards Somalia”
* 5 July 2024: “Turkiye’s Mediation Between Ethiopia & Somalia Is Well-Intentioned But Will Likely Be Fruitless”
* 21 August 2024: “Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorist Troops Might Stay In Somalia Even If Mogadishu Demands Their Departure”
The latest proposal comes amidst worsening Ethiopian-Egyptian ties brought about by Cairo’s deployment of troops to Somalia ahead of next year’s post-AU security mission, which Addis condemned as a provocation given their existing tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt had previously implied an intent to go to war with Ethiopia over its filling, ergo why Egypt’s aforesaid deployment is widely seen as a means to lend more credence to such threats, including via a proxy war.
The reported scale of Egypt’s deployment per the deal that it agreed to with Somalia suggests that this move is irreversible no matter how regionally destabilizing it is, thus leading to the conclusion that the tacit MoU pretext that was exploited to this end is no longer relevant. Ethiopia’s hypothetical scrapping of its deal with Somaliland to recognize its independence and give it stakes in at least one national company in exchange for military-commercial port access therefore wouldn’t alleviate this threat.
Even in the scenario that it did, Ethiopia would then return to where it was at in the run-up to its MoU with Somaliland whereby the maritime logistics upon which the stability of Africa’s second most populous country depends would be monopolized by tiny Djibouti, which is a huge national security risk. While that statelet wouldn’t be able to extort such exorbitant fees from its gigantic neighbor if it gave the latter “100% management” of its own port there, it would still control the corridor between them.
Considering this, Youssouf’s offer is nothing but a trap since it wouldn’t result in the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Somalia and would restore Djibouti’s monopoly over Ethiopia’s global trade, not to mention discrediting Addis since it would have to scrap its MoU with Hargeisa. Ethiopia would harm its own reputation in order to return to its lopsided dependence on Djibouti without alleviating the threat that Egypt poses in Somalia in what amounts to one of the worst deals ever proposed.
