False perceptions, uninformed assumptions, and even blatant lies about Russian policy are wildly circulating across the Pakistani segment of social media due to the artificially engineered hysteria over its ties with the Taliban premised on the unsubstantiated claim that Russia is arming them against Pakistan. There’s also palpable rage over Russia and Pakistan’s polar opposite views on Taliban-led Afghanistan that were expressed during the eighth meeting of the Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan.
Left unaddressed, positive Pakistani perceptions of Russia shaped by their rapprochement could reversed, thus risking them once again viewing it as a hostile state. The hard work of their diplomats and members of their civil societies over the past decade, including in the expert and journalist communities, in improving people-to-people ties would then be for naught. It’s with the intent of averting that worst-case scenario that seven important points about Russia’s South Asian policy will now be clarified:
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* Russian-Afghan Military Ties
– No evidence has yet to emerge proving that Russia has armed the Taliban, with this spring’s military-technical deal only officially concerning the repair of Russian equipment. Nevertheless, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently declared that improving the Taliban’s anti-terrorist capabilities is in the interests of everyone, and he said that this could take the form of material assistance. The context is that Russia considers the Taliban to be the most effective bulwark against ISIS-K’s expansion into Central Asia.
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* The Taliban’s Ties To Terrorists
– Russia earlier warned about terrorist groups in Afghanistan, particularly ISIS-K, but doesn’t believe that the Taliban are colluding with them. As for the TTP (“Pakistani Taliban”), Russia considers them to be a terrorist group, but it doesn’t fully understand its ties with the Taliban. Russia acknowledges Pakistan’s claims that the TTP are functioning as Taliban proxies, and that might be a reason why it’s yet to arm the Taliban against ISIS-K, but it doesn’t believe that this disqualifies the Taliban as a partner against ISIS-K.
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* The Afghan-Pakistani War
– Russia acknowledges both side’s claims that the other backs terrorists without endorsing either, and it condemns all terrorist attacks, but it calls for an urgent end to hostilities so that diplomacy can have another chance to resolve the root issues at the core of this conflict. Some might understandably consider this idealistic, but it’s premised on Russia’s perception of this conflict as a state-to-state one due to its official recognition of the Taliban, and this is its standard approach to such conflicts.
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* Russia’s Regional Vision
– Russia envisages Afghanistan facilitating energy cooperation and trade with Pakistan. It also wants to help Pakistan unleash its economic potential through energy deals and infrastructure modernization. If successful, then Russia hopes that Pakistan and India might compromise on Kashmir so that it could then expand this overland corridor to India, thus benefiting them all. The pursuit of this vision contextualizes Russia’s recognition of the Taliban, rapprochement with Pakistan, and strategic partnership with India.
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* The Kashmir Conflict
– Russia unapologetically supports India, but just like with the Afghan-Pakistani War, it calls for this conflict to be resolved through diplomatic means instead of military ones. The Kremlin has offered to mediate if both sides request it even though this proposal upset some Indians. They were also perturbed by its publicly financed international media flagships’ coverage of spring 2025’s Indo-Pak clashes that was perceived as being “too neutral” given that Russia is India’s special and privileged strategic partner.
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* India’s Military Ties With The US
– Russia doesn’t consider India’s growing military ties with the US to be a problem since India has assured Russia that it won’t host US bases or forces, nor will this trend come at the expense of their strategic partnership, which continues to diversify from its military centricity. What’s most important for Russia is that these ties don’t destabilize the broader region such as if India subordinated itself to the US as its regional proxy. India highly values its strategic autonomy, however, so it wouldn’t ever do that.
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* Pakistan’s Military Ties With The US
– Russia accepts Pakistan’s decades-long military ties with the US as a regional constant, just like Pakistan accepts its similar ties with India, with both having tacitly agreed that they won’t impede the expansion of bilateral ties. Nevertheless, Russia believes that Pakistani-US military ties previously destabilized the broader region, and Lavrov recently implied that the return of US bases to Pakistan or drone overflight rights to Afghanistan would be a problem. Russia hopes that this won’t happen.
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To summarize, Russia finally overcame lingering Soviet-era perceptions of Pakistan and the Taliban to bravely pioneer rapprochements with each former adversary, the first of which has raised concern among some in India over the past decade and the second of which has now done the same in Pakistan. Their concerns are acknowledged, but Russia sincerely believes that it’s implementing a very careful balancing act in the region that isn’t aimed against anyone, and it doesn’t want them overreacting to it.
The proliferation of fake news about its regional balancing act risks being exploited, whether by factions within some of its partners’ governments or by the US, to falsely justify hostile policies that could ruin their ties. For example, Pakistan might hypothetically arm Ukraine on the false pretext of “revenge” for Russia supposedly arming the Taliban against it, which was discussed here. At this sensitive moment in bilateral relations, diplomatic and expert dialogue is urgently required, not more social media hysteria.
