The self-described “powerful military action” that Trump authorized over the weekend against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, which aligns with the reinstatement of his “maximum pressure” policy against the group’s Iranian patron and follows their redesignation by the US as terrorists, was criticized by Russia. Foreign Minister Lavrov told his US counterpart Rubio during their call on Saturday that there should be an “immediate cessation of the use of force” and the resumption of political dialogue to end the crisis.
Before proceeding, it’s important to clarify that his words shouldn’t be interpreted as supporting the Houthis since Russia has proven to be neutral towards this conflict, the fact of which contradicts popular Alt-Media narratives. Top influencers have suggested or even outright claimed that Russia is allied with them against Israel and the US, but this couldn’t be further from the truth since it’s criticized them on previous occasions in spite of also hosting them for talks. Here are some background briefings:
* 7 November 2021: “Russia’s Position Towards The Yemen War”
* 22 February 2023: “What Explains Russia’s Conspicuous Neutrality Towards The Yemeni Conflict?”
* 4 January 2024: “Russia’s Condemnation Of The Houthis’ Maritime Attacks Discredits A Popular Narrative”
* 12 January 2024: “Why Didn’t Russia Veto The UNSC Resolution That The West Just Exploited To Attack The Houthis?”
* 13 January 2024: “Russia’s Response To The West’s Anti-Houthi Strikes Will Remain Limited To Rhetoric”
* 18 March 2024: “Why’d The Houthis Twist The Truth By Claiming To Have Ties With Russia, China, And BRICS?”
* 3 July 2024: “Fake News Alert: Russia Isn’t Arming The Houthis”
* 5 August 2024: “Was Russia About To Arm The Houthis Until Saudi Arabia Intervened?”
* 10 October 2024: “Russia’s Plans To Reopen Its Embassy In Yemen Cast Doubt On The Latest Houthi Arms Report”
* 25 November 2024: “The Report About Russia’s Alleged Recruitment Of Houthi Mercenaries Is Misleading”
* 12 December 2024: “Russia Dodged A Bullet By Wisely Choosing Not To Ally With The Now-Defeated Resistance Axis”
Moving along after having shared the facts about Russia’s ties with the Houthis in particular and the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis” more broadly, a few words should be said about its interests in this conflict. While Russia still officially supports retaining Yemeni unity, its approach might change in line with the evolving situation on the ground and in the world more generally. Beginning with the first, here are five background briefings about why the restoration of South Yemeni independence is in Russia’s interests:
* 3 March 2021: “South Yemen Has A Crucial Significance For The Gulf Of Aden-Red Sea Region”
* 10 March 2023: “Any Political Solution To The Yemeni War Must Restore South Yemen’s Independence”
* 12 March 2023: “Yemen’s Trifurcation Is Arguably A Fait Accompli”
* 8 February 2024: “Regional Crises Offer Unique Strategic Opportunities For South Yemen”
* 18 May 2024: “Russian Investments In Yemen Could Incentivize Moscow To Mediate A Resolution To Its Conflict”
And here are five background briefings about the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” of the past month:
* 14 February 2025: “Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West & How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?”
* 15 February 2025: “Vance’s Munich Speech Vindicated Putin’s Summer 2022 Prediction About Political Change In Europe”
* 25 February 2025: “Russia & The US’ Diplomatic Choreography At The UN Shows Their Commitment To A ‘New Détente’”
* 5 March 2025: “Putin Might Broker An Iranian-US ‘New Détente’ As A Reciprocal Favor To Trump”
* 6 March 2025: “Korybko To Newsweek: A Russian-US ‘New Détente’ Would Revolutionize International Relations”
It’ll now be explained why Russia should soon work towards restoring South Yemen’s independence.
The Houthis’ reported interest in negotiating peace with the US after last weekend’s strikes could lead to the resumption of peace talks exactly as Russia wants, in which case it would be in a position to play the kingmaker between its close but competing Iranian, Saudi, and Emirati partners. Iran is the Houthis’ patron, Saudi Arabia supports Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, and the UAE is allied with South Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC), all three of which Russia has close bilateral ties with too.
Its close relations with these six direct stakeholders in the conflict imbue it with the trust needed to mediate a series of pragmatic compromises between them if all parties, including the US, have the political will. Russia’s interests in investing the diplomatic resources that such a role would require are to raise its global prestige, reinforce its excellent ties with all six stakeholders while strengthening ties with the US, and securing investment opportunities and likely also a naval base in a revived South Yemen.
The following three facts could greatly influence whatever peace proposal Russia could put forth: 1) Yemen has once again bifurcated into its historically distinct Northern and Southern halves; 2) the prevalence of “non-state justice” like blood feuds could easily turn forced reunification into a bloodbath so this should be avoided for the sake of civilians and stability; and 3) the UAE-backed STC and Saudi Arabia are fiercely competing for influence in South Yemen’s Hadramout and Mahra regions.
Russia’s peace proposal could therefore take the following form: 1) all sides confirm Yemen’s redivision into North and South; 2) the Line of Contact becomes the provisional border; 3) sanctions are lifted on the Houthis upon North Yemen’s partial demilitarization; 4) South Yemen forms a regionally and tribally inclusive committee to determine whether the country will be a unitary state (with possible autonomy to Hadramout and/or Mahra), a federal, or confederal one; and 5) the UN adjudicates any disputes.
The third point about North Yemen’s partial demilitarization would likely require an additional Russian-brokered agreement between the Houthis, Saudi Arabia, and the STC that would then necessitate the creation of a UN observation and enforcement mechanism. The Houthis might understandably be averse to any part of this proposal, but continued military action by the US could coerce them into reconsidering, after which they might agree since the alternative could be losing North Yemen entirely.
Without partial demilitarization, Saudi Arabia might not feel comfortable agreeing to the restoration of North Yemeni independence, especially since it would be an Iranian-allied state on the Kingdom’s doorstep. That said, any Russian-brokered “New Détente” between Iran and the US of the sort suggested in one of the previously cited analyses above could result in Iran curtailing or even cutting off its armed support for the Houthis, thus making North Yemen’s partial demilitarization less significant of an issue.
If successfully implemented, Russia could be rewarded with very profitable investment opportunities in South Yemen and even a naval base in Aden, which could complement its planned one in nearby Port Sudan or replace it if those plans ultimately don’t materialize. The UAE would likely retain its existing military facilities in South Yemen, while Saudi Arabia and perhaps the US might obtain naval bases in Hadramout and/or Mahra depending on their possible autonomy under a new constitution.
None of those four – South Yemen, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the US – is expected to accept an Iranian base of any kind in North Yemen, however, which could formally be ruled out through the proposed Russian-brokered agreement on its partial demilitarization. Iran would foreseeably remain North Yemen’s top ally, but this wouldn’t be allowed to take any form that those four consider threatening. Again, the Houthis might vehemently reject these proposals, but they could be forced to reconsider.
Reverting to the present, it’s of prime importance that Russia recognizes the historic opportunity before it in Yemen at this moment and responds accordingly to position itself as the kingmaker otherwise the situation might soon drastically deteriorate with unpredictable consequences for all stakeholders. Now is the perfect time for Russia to work towards reviving South Yemeni independence as the cornerstone of that conflict’s peace plan, but it remains to be seen whether or not it even knows this.
