Reuters cited unnamed sources to report that Israel is lobbying the US to keep Russia’s bases in Syria as part of a plan to counterbalance Turkish influence there. According to them, Israel fears that Hamas might relocate to Syria and then operate from there under Turkish protection, which could drastically worsen Israeli-Turkish tensions. They didn’t explain how Russia’s continued military presence in Syria could avert that scenario, however, nor how the US could convince Syria not to kick them out either.
Nevertheless, the little that was revealed sheds light on what Israel might have in mind, namely an informal trilateral arrangement centered on their shared interests in preventing Turkiye from dominating post-Assad Syria. Should they fail, then Russia fears that Turkiye could hold its bases there hostage as part of some geopolitical blackmail scheme; Israel fears Hamas establishing itself there with Turkish protection; and the US fears the preceding scenario leading to a serious crisis within its allied network.
The first step towards protecting their corresponding interests is to ensure that Syria can rely on Russia as an economic and military counterbalance to Turkiye, which necessitates the US agreeing to let Russia maintain its military presence there. The prerequisite is getting the US to understand Russia’s crucial role in this respect, ergo the reported Israeli lobbying, after which the US would then have to convey this to Syria. That could take the form of assuring it that sanctions relief isn’t conditional on kicking Russia out.
An unnamed high-ranking EU official told reporters in late January that “We have already informed the new authorities in Syria that the normalization process hinges on removing all manner of foreign presence, be it military or some other tentacles. Three countries are present there, and Russia is one of them. So yes, we keep pressing them on this matter.” In spite of that, the EU just lifted some sanctions on energy, transport, and banking, thus suggesting that its position has unofficially changed since then.
This volte-face is either due to Israeli lobbying and/or US pressure, the first of which would show that the EU is still doing regional favors for Israel even after harshly criticizing its conduct in Gaza while the second would show that the transatlantic rift over Ukraine isn’t as serious as many thought. After all, it’s a major concession on the EU’s part to lift some sanctions on Syria even though Russia still retains its two bases there that the bloc demanded be removed as a condition for this, hence the aforesaid speculation.
With this precedent in mind, it can be concluded that Israel has already made progress on relieving external pressure upon Syria to kick Russia out, whether by lobbying the EU and/or the US, the latter with regard to having possibly gotten it to convince the Europeans about the importance of this. The next step is to then ensure that the terms that Syria requires from Russia for keeping its bases aren’t so onerous as to (perhaps deliberately at Turkiye’s behest) scuttle their talks on this issue.
It’s here where the spirit of the nascent Russian–US “New Détente” could see the US can explain to Syria that it wouldn’t object to Russia rebuilding some of its armed forces that Israel destroyed late last year within certain limits and conveying that Israel agrees to this as well. At the same time, the US can also convey that Israel might destroy whatever equipment Syria receives from Turkiye and could resume its years-long bombing campaign there against what it considers to be terrorists, in this case Hamas.
This carrot-and-stick approach might be sufficient for Syria to agree to scale back whatever onerous demands it might make of Russia in exchange for preserving its military presence, provided of course that the interim authorities are rational, though that can’t be taken for granted given their sordid pasts. Should this second step succeed, then the final one would be for the US to advise Syria on how to most effectively leverage its renewed strategic partnership with Russia for counterbalancing Turkiye.
Apart from allowing it to rebuild the Syrian Armed Forces within certain agreed-upon limits, this could take the form of offering Russia more energy and reconstruction contracts to expand its existing presence in these spheres, which can be explained to Turkiye on the basis that Russia has more experience. Even if Turkiye interprets this as a snub, its hands would be tied in terms of how to respond since any vindictive pressure upon Syria could counterproductively push Syria further away from it.
Through these means, Russia, Israel, and the US would advance their shared interests in preventing Turkiye from dominating post-Assad Syria, which could then result in more trilateral cooperation on other issues such as convincing Iran to reach a new nuclear deal with the US. There’s even the possibility of expanding their trilateral to include their shared Indian partner so as to form a quadrilateral for managing European, Mideast, and Asia-Pacific affairs if the “New Détente” leads to a new world order.
Israel knows which way the wind is blowing and will therefore do whatever is needed to ensure that its interests are safeguarded by key players in the global systemic transition. Unilaterally advancing these same interests could entail enormous costs and risks such as if it feels compelled to bomb Hamas militants sheltering in Turkiye’s Syrian bases should that worst-case scenario materialize. That’s why Israel prefers to find common ground with Russia and the US in order for them to help it with this.
While the Russian-US interplay in Syria is pivotal for protecting Israel’s regional security interests, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is pivotal for advancing Israel’s economic interests. That megaproject was frozen after October 7th but Israel hopes to soon revive it. The US also participates in IMEC while Putin declared that “[IMEC] will only benefit us” so this serves as yet another convergence of their interests with Israel’s and could justify expanding their trilateral into a quadrilateral with India.
For there to be any chance of that happening, the Russian-US interplay in Syria must first succeed in convincing that country’s interim authorities to maintain Russia’s military presence there, after which it must effectively counterbalance Turkiye with Israeli-advised US guidance. Only then might their trilateral move towards other issues, dependent in large part on the “New Détente” unfolding in parallel, and consider inviting India to join them in forming a “Big Four” that geopolitically reshapes Eurasia.
