The latest Congolese Crisis broke out over the weekend after the reportedly Rwandan-backed M23 rebels seized the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) eastern city of Goma along the country’s mineral-rich periphery. Russia’s position as articulated by Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia on Sunday during an emergency UNSC briefing was impressively balanced as explained here on Tuesday. He then recalibrated it later that same day upon blaming M23 for the latest crisis.
His latest UNSC briefing saw him declare that “Russia strongly condemns the actions of M23. We call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for a withdrawal of the rebels of this illegal armed group from the towns, villages and territories they have seized. We also call on external players to stop supporting M23 and recall their military units.” This is in marked contrast to what he said just two days prior where he placed equal blame on them and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).
Nebenzia also said at the time that both the majority-Tutsi M23’s and majority-Hutu FDLR’s foreign state patrons, contextually understood to be Rwanda and the DRC respectively though not named for reasons of diplomatic sensitivity, must “stop their interaction with (such) illegal armed groups.” This swift policy recalibration left some observers scratching their heads but it’s arguably attributable to two major developments that took place earlier on Tuesday.
The first is that rioters in Kinshasa attacked the embassies of countries that they accused of supporting M23, which included African nations like Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda alongside Western ones like the US, France, and Belgium. Russia enjoys close security ties with Rwanda in the Central African Republic (CAR), has cultivated excellent ones with Uganda over the past few years, and is trying to make inroads in Kenya, all while being presently being engaged in a proxy war with the West in Ukraine.
Accordingly, the radical shift in public opinion in the DRC against the West could be seen by Russia as an opportunity to further expand its soft power in this resource-rich nation with a view towards eventually replacing Western contracts there, which provides a partial explanation for Russia’s shift against M23. Moreover, Russia has also been keeping an eye on the US’ Lobito Corridor, which is a transcontinental rail project aimed at linking Angola, DRC, Zambia, and Tanzania.
Its purpose is to redirect mineral exports from Asia to America, after which new local elite can be groomed in preparation for geopolitically pivoting the region away from China and towards the US in the New Cold War. The latest embassy attacks suggest that public opinion might no longer accept the Lobito Corridor, which could be targeted in the future, thus possibly leading to its curtailment or cancelation. That could provide yet another opportunity for Russia to replace the West’s possibly lost role in the DRC.
Unlike the West, Russia doesn’t need to turn the DRC or other African states into vassals since it’s self-sufficient in resources, including minerals. For that reason, its strategic goal is to empower them to become more sovereign and consequently deprive the West of the resources that it extracts from there to maintain its declining unipolar hegemony, which makes it a much better partner. It therefore wouldn’t make sense for Russia to remain balanced in this crisis given the enticing strategic opportunities at stake.
The second development occurred shortly after those attacks and concerns the African Union’s Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) communique later that day. It condemned M23’s offensive while calling on that group, FDLR, and others to “immediately and unconditionally cease their attacks and permanently disband and lay down their arms”. The communique also demanded M23’s withdrawal from Goma and the surrounding region alongside other groups’ while condemning foreign support for it and FDLR.
While it might seem balanced at first glance, it’s clearly more critical of M23 than of any other group, including FDLR. M23 is basically being accused of setting into motion the latest violence, which thus makes it more responsible than anyone else for the regional humanitarian and security consequences. The communique also strongly alludes to Rwandan support for their actions. Given that the PSC is the AU’s equivalent of the UNSC, it’s natural that Russia would take its African policy cues from that body.
Their communique combined with the anti-Western embassy attacks in Kinshasa earlier that day to compel Russia into recalibrating its policy towards the latest Congolese Crisis during that afternoon’s UNSC briefing. Nebenzia importantly didn’t condemn Rwanda, with whom his country’s armed forces coordinate in the CAR in defense of its UN-recognized government, but he still made it known that Russia considers M23 to be the aggressor that’s responsible for this crisis.
This new approach will likely result in Russia’s soft power expanding by leaps and bounds in the DRC, which is altogether a much more promising regional partner than Rwanda if Moscow was forced to choose between them, though Moscow might still remain careful not to ruin ties with Kigali. Not only do they cooperate in the CAR as was mentioned above and have pretty good bilateral relations, but Rwanda is a regional military superpower, and it’s never wise to get on such countries’ bad side if one can help it.
Russia isn’t scared of Rwanda, it just doesn’t want to enter into a needless rivalry that might later be exploited by the West to divide-and-rule them if that bloc’s ties with Kigali ever improve, in which case they might make any rapprochement conditional on Rwanda actively containing Russia in the region. The scenario of Rwandan forces in the CAR turning their guns against the Russians there would be a nightmare in itself and could possibly turn into a geostrategic disaster if it leads to their withdrawal.
Although the CAR is a Russian ally that agreed to let it establish a base there, its government is also cavorting with American mercenaries as explained here last September, so it can’t be ruled out that Rwanda might be enticed by the West into kicking Russia out of the CAR if offered the right incentives. To be clear, there’s no indication that anything of the sort is being discussed, but the scenario is realistic enough and might explain why Russia is still reluctant to condemn Rwanda despite condemning M23.
Russia’s increasingly pro-DRC position therefore isn’t expected to transform into an overtly anti-Rwandan one due to the abovementioned CAR factor even if its rhetoric against M23 becomes even harsher. The Kremlin hopes to reap a soft power windfall from the Congolese Crisis by replicating the PSC’s approach and riding the waves of rising anti-Western sentiment in the DRC, which it hopes will one day enable it to replace the West’s possibly lost role there for the purpose of depriving that bloc of its mineral wealth.
Russia doesn’t want to exploit the Congolese or keep those resources for itself, which are indispensable for the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”/“Great Reset”, but simply to ensure that the West no longer has privileged access to them for maintaining its declining unipolar hegemony. Observers should therefore pay much more attention to the latest Congolese Crisis since it has the potential to decisively shift the balance of power in the New Cold War depending on how it develops and what the outcome might be.
