The escalating disagreements between Azerbaijan and Turkiye, which readers can learn more about here, inspired respected Azerbaijani expert Turan Rzayev to recently publish a piece titled “Erdogan’s ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ plan: Azerbaijan will not be anyone’s outpost”. He argued that their countries’ relationship as “one nation, two states” shouldn’t be taken advantage of by Ankara. That in turn inspired the present piece, which will share six tips for fine-tuning Azerbaijan’s geostrategic balancing act.
The first three are well-intentioned pieces of advice aimed at sparking a discussion among Azerbaijani experts about the proposed policy recalibrations while the last three are reaffirmations of existing policy due to their value. The overall purpose is to explore ways in which Azerbaijan can preemptively avert the perceived challenge posed by Neo-Ottomanism without inadvertently harming relations with Turkiye. What Azerbaijan does in the future will reverberate across Eurasia due to its pivotal location therein.
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1. Ensure That TRIPP Isn’t Clandestinely Militarized By Turkiye
Some in Russia suspect that August 2025’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) could be exploited as a Turkish-led NATO military logistics corridor along its entire southern periphery. The conformation of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces to NATO standards in November 2025, their planned joint drills with NATO, Azerbaijan’s strengthened military ties with the UK in December 2025, and its joint military-production deals with Ukraine in April heightened Russia’s threat perception of Azerbaijan.
The worst-case scenario is that this security dilemma leads to a mutually devastating Ukrainian-like crisis, but that could be averted through the goodwill gesture of Azerbaijan allowing Russian customs agents to inspect TRIPP cargo modeled off of the precedent agreed upon in November 2020 for inside southern Armenia. A related goodwill gesture could also be agreeing not to host NATO forces for joint drills and only participating in them abroad. The risk of a Ukrainian-like crisis would then immediately disappear.
2. Keep The CAC Distinct From The OTS
Azerbaijan’s formal inclusion in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of States of Central Asia last year was paralleled by a proposal to transform the organization into the “Central Asian Community” (CAC). It’s imperative that the CAC is kept distinct from the Turkish-led “Organization of Turkic States” (OTS), however, otherwise the OTS might come to functionally replace the CAC in furtherance of Turkiye’s Neo-Ottoman ambitions at the expense of the other members’ interests.
While the CAC countries share important socio-cultural ties with Turkiye, they have much closer economic, historical, and security ones amongst themselves, and the last-mentioned dimension mustn’t be gradually replaced by the OTS otherwise a Ukrainian-like crisis with Russia might follow. After all, Russia could easily perceive that development as mirroring NATO’s de facto expansion of influence into Ukraine with all that could entail, so the CAC countries must do their utmost to preemptively avert that.
3. Rely More On Israel & India As Regional Counterbalances
Azerbaijan’s de facto allied relations with Israel are widely thought to be one of the reasons why Turkiye is upset with its Turkic brother. Nevertheless, these ties counterbalance the dual perceived threats of Neo-Ottomanism and Iran, ergo their indispensability to Azerbaijan’s geostrategic balancing act. Symbolic Azerbaijani membership in the Abraham Accords following Kazakhstan’s lead last year and the launching of an annual or biennial CAC-Israeli summit might be the next steps for reinforcing their ties.
Likewise, a meaningful rapprochement with India could help assuage Iran’s threat perception of Azerbaijan’s de facto allied relations with Israel, which could take the form of closer cooperation on the North-South Transport Corridor’s western branch through the South Caucasus. The existing biennial India-Central Asian Summit could be expanded to become an India-CAC one through Azerbaijan’s participation. Iran’s potential participation, even as an observer, could further improve bilateral ties.
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4. Proudly Maintain Azerbaijan’s Continued Military Build-Up
The first of the three policies that must be maintained is Aliyev’s declaration to the ruling party in early October that their country will continue its military build-up for deterrence purposes. Azerbaijan knows more than most states that it can only depend on itself for ensuring national security. Anyone who calls for the deceleration of this process will be met with distrust by patriotic Azerbaijanis. This policy is non-negotiable, as it should be, but it can also be fine-tuned for preemptively averting security dilemmas.
For instance, arms control agreements could be explored with Russia and Iran as regards the number and type of forces deployed near their border and/or in the Caspian Sea, the proposal of which would reaffirm that Azerbaijan harbors no hostile intentions against either of them. This would be all the more convincing if the three proposals above are already being implemented or seriously discussed. What’s most important is that neither perceives Azerbaijan’s continued military build-up as a threat.
5. Gently Reinforce Aliyev’s Status As A Turkic Role Model
President Ilham Aliyev is the longest-serving head of state among the Turkic CAC countries, non-Turkic Tajik President Emomali Rahmon being the exception, which thus makes him a natural Turkic role model. While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in office slightly longer and is a little bit older, he lacks Aliyev’s socio-cultural, historical, and regional political understanding of the Central Asian Republics. That’s because he was shaped by a totally different milieu. He also isn’t secular like they are.
For these reasons, Aliyev’s Turkic CAC counterparts and members of their societies might naturally look to him for inspiration and guidance, not Erdogan. To be clear, nothing is being implied about Aliyev and his country pressuring others to do anything, let alone imposing anything upon them. All that’s being done is drawing attention to Aliyev’s status as a role model and that of Azerbaijan in general. If gently reinforced through creative diplomacy and soft power, then this can greatly benefit him and his nation.
6. Preserve The “One Nation, Two States” Principle Within Limits
Azeris and Turks are fraternal people, truly one nation, two states. Anyone who tries to divide them is therefore doing a disservice to each and has ulterior motives. They shouldn’t ever be trusted again. Nevertheless, Rzayev’s critiques of Neo-Ottomanism should be taken seriously by Turkiye since they calmly reflect the concerns of some Azeris, especially amidst the pro-hijab protests that some of his compatriots suspect are being organized at least in part by Turkish activists (who might be state-linked).
Accordingly, the drawing of clearly defined boundaries within the “one nation, two states” principle is required for preserving it. Azerbaijan has the sovereign right to formulate its domestic policy however its leadership so chooses no matter how sensitive the issue may be. The same goes for its foreign policy as regards partnering with any state for any reason. Simply put, Turkiye must respect Azerbaijan’s new uniform school policy that some interpret as banning the hijab as well as its de facto alliance with Israel.
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All states’ geostrategic balancing acts require fine-tuning, which will become more regular amidst the Age of Complexity in order to maximally safeguard one’s hard-earned strategic autonomy in the face of rising multifaceted challenges, including from close partners. In Azerbaijan’s case, the perceived challenge posed by allied Turkiye’s Neo-Ottomanism is serious, but it can be effectively addressed through the three well-intentioned pieces of advice above and the three suggested policy reaffirmations.
As a wise leader with as much experience as Erdogan, Aliyev seems to truly understand the task at hand, which contextualizes Azerbaijan’s formal and informal moves as of late. The same goes for his country’s diplomats, experts, and journalists. They all agree that Azerbaijan’s grand strategic goal is to continue its rapid ascent as a Middle Power. That requires fine-tuning its geostrategic balancing act, which this piece aims to assist them with for maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in the broader Caspian region.
