RT republished a piece in early September by Vasily Kashin, the Director of the Higher School of Economics’ Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, about how “America has the power to defeat Iran. Why can’t it use it?” He spent time comparing the Third Gulf War to the First Gulf War (relative to those three out of four in which the US was directly involved). The US marshalled more resources, mobilized a larger coalition, and had a much greater tolerance for casualties back then.
According to Kashin, that’s no longer the case because “The political system that accepted such (casualty) risks in 1990 appears unwilling to accept them today”. He pointed to last spring’s dramatic rescue of a downed airman and US forces operating at considerable distance from Iran as proof of this. Kashin also mentioned perceived financial constraints. He echoed his colleague Fyodor Lukyanov by concluding that the US “struggles to convert its military superiority into the political outcomes it seeks.”
Kashin’s comparison between the Third and First Gulf Wars is compelling, and his conclusions are logical, but those two conflicts have two very important differences that account for the US now marshalling less resources, mobilizing a smaller coalition (essentially just Israel), and have a lower casualty tolerance. The latest one is widely perceived as a war of choice to essentially seize Iran’s energy while the first one was a response to Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait and accordingly aimed to force its full withdrawal back home.
Having clarified these differences, it’s now time to address Kashin’s conclusions, which echo Lukyanov’s. This isn’t the first time that the US “struggled to convert its military superiority into the political outcomes it seeks” as proven by the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Opinions differ on why the US didn’t nuke their respective northern communist governments, but a reasonable one is that such an overreaction could have been seen as a tacit admission of defeat and also risked sparking wider wars.
As regards the Third Gulf War, Trump was asked in late August about whether he’ll nuke Iran, to which he angrily responded by declaring that “They’re totally defeated militarily, so I defeat them, and now I should use a nuclear weapon on top of them? What a stupid question.” This lends credence to the explanation that a gross overreaction like nuking North Korea, North Vietnam, or Iran would be seen as disproportionate and therefore self-discrediting for the US, even more so than losing those wars.
Likewise, the same holds true as regards Russia nuking Ukraine, which would almost certainly be perceived that way by Russia’s adversaries and possibly the Global South too. It also begs the questions of what exactly Russia would nuke in Ukraine and how exactly that would achieve Russia’s stated goals in the conflict. This question answers Kashin’s remixed one of “Why doesn’t Russia defeat Ukraine despite having the power to do so?” Simply put, nukes aren’t the solution for Russia, nor are they for the US.
Nevertheless, Iran poses no threat to the US’ existence, while Ukraine’s NATO-backed “war of attrition” could threaten Russia’s existence through its gradual deindustrialization and demilitarization. Zelensky’s 40-day influence operation fell far short of this goal, but if it’s ever resumed at scale indefinitely, then Russia’s calculations could change. While it might not nuke Ukraine, it might still obliterate its main cities with Oreshniks in a bid to restore deterrence, but Putin would prefer not to have to do that to win.
